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TELEVISION AND THE LAW IN
THE SOVIET UNION
Michael J. Bazyler t and Eugene Sadovoy
"Face the facts, baby, there ain't no news in Russia"
-Clark Gable, playing a Moscow correspondent
in 1940 movie, Comrade X
"Raising a television camera in the Soviet Union is equivalent
to raising an M-16 - everybody scatters"
-Former ABC Television Moscow correspondent
Anne Garrells
I. INTRODUCTION
A good indicator of a nation's political system is the state of its tele-
vision industry. If the system is democratic, television will provide, in
addition to entertainment, valuable critical coverage of the government
and events in the country.' In a totalitarian system, television news
merely presents the formal governmental position.2
t Professor of Law, Whittier College School of Law. A.B. 1974, University of Califor-
nia, Los Angeles; J.D. 1978, University of Southern California. Professor Bazyler was born in
the Soviet Union and came to the United States in 1964.
Broadcast journalist and host of America Tonight, the first American weekly broadcast
on Soviet television; Lecturer of Russian, University of California, Los Angeles. B.A., Univer-
sity of Leningrad, 1983; M.A. University of Southern California, 1988. Mr. Sadovoy was born
in the Soviet Union and came to the United States in 1983.
1. S.W. HEAD, WORLD BROADCASTING SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 177
(1985); W.J. HOWELL, JR., WORLD BROADCASTING IN THE AGE OF THE SATELLITE 12
(1986); B. PAULU, RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTING IN EASTERN EUROPE 8-10
(1974).
For treatments of Soviet television by western sources see H. SMITH, THE NEW RUSSIANS
148-173 (1990); E. MICKEWICZ, SPLIT SIGNALS: TELEVISION AND POLITICS IN THE SOVIET
UNION (1988); R. ENGLISH & J. HALPERIN, THE OTHER SIDE: How SOVIETS AND AMERI-
CANS PERCEIVE EACH OTHER 51-85 (1987) [hereinafter THE OTHER SIDE] (the two introduc-
tory quotes are from this treatise); McNair, Glasnost And Restructuring in the Soviet Media, 11
MEDIA CULTURE & SOCIETY 327 (1989); Buhks, Nouveaux Programmes Mixtes Show/Actual-
ites A La Television Sovietique, 30 CAHIERS DU MONDE RUSSE ET SOVIETIQUE 159 (1989);
Mickewicz, Mass Culture, Change And Mobilization: The Media Revolution, 15 SOVIET
UNION/SOVIETIQUE UNION 187 (1988) (hereinafter Mass Culture].
Summaries and transcripts of selected Soviet television shows, Soviet articles on the mass
media, and texts of Soviet laws affecting the Soviet mass media are available through the For-
eign Broadcasting Information Service [hereinafter FBIS].
2. S.W. HEAD, supra note 1, at 59, 135; B. PAULU, supra note 1, at 11.
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Two sets of laws determine whether television news will be open or
censored. The first are laws dealing with speech. If speech laws effec-
tively provide for freedom of speech for the nation's citizenry, television
news coverage likewise will be open.3 The second are legal rules regard-
ing ownership of television stations. If private industry is legally allowed
to enter the television field, alternative points of view will be presented to
the public. A private television system cannot exist in a totalitarian
state.4
Since 1985, Soviet television, like the rest of Soviet society, has un-
dergone a revolution. For the first time in its existence, Soviet television
has been allowed to criticize the government and to present events as
they actually are, rather than as the rulers wish for them to be.' In fact,
television in the USSR has been the pioneer in breaking many of the
taboos formerly constraining the nation's mass media.6 In 1990, after
much debate, the Soviets promulgated laws seeking both to abolish cen-
sorship in the mass media and allow the creation of a private television
industry.7 These laws are an important first step aimed at guaranteeing
freedom of speech for the Soviet mass media and eventually transforming
Soviet television from a highly centralized, state-run system to a decen-
tralized and privately-owned television industry.
Time will tell whether these legal changes are temporary or perma-
nent. Unfortunately, 1991 has started off badly. With the gradual break-
down of Soviet society, the nation's political system has taken a sharp
turn to the right.' Fittingly, the first indicator of the Soviet Union's
move away from democracy has been the State's increased control of
Soviet television. Soviet television in 1991, unlike in its most recent past,
increasingly presents only the sanitized, government version of the
news.9 Controversial news programs have been removed from the air,' °
and the central government has taken over control of television program-
ming; in one instance even seizing by force a television broadcasting
3. S.W. HEAD, supra note 1, at 59, 178.
4. Id. at 59, 61. For an excellent discussion by a liberal Soviet economist on the problems
of de-nationalizing Soviet industries see Naishul, The Sufferings of Privatization, Soviet Ana-
lyst, Jan. 23, 1991, at 3.
5. For a discussion of the recent changes in Soviet society under Gorbachev see Bazyler,
The Gorbachev Revolution, 12 WHITTIER L. REV. 1501 (1990).
6. According to one western scholar, "Under Gorbachev, television has been accorded
status as a powerful vehicle for the shaping of public opinion." E. MICKEWIcz, supra note 1, at
179.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 96-189.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 190-94.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 190-234.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 198-200.
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center.1 Laws guaranteeing freedom of speech for the mass media, still
in their embryonic stage, already are being ignored, and may eventually
be repealed. Privatization and decentralization of Soviet television has
also been put on hold. 2
This article examines television and the law in the Soviet Union.
Part I presents the history of Soviet television from its first appearance in
the 1940s to March, 1985. This part focuses on the legal rules in the
Soviet Union governing early television programming and broadcasting.
Part II examines the role television played in the Gorbachev reforms.
This part sets out and analyzes the laws passed between 1985 and 1990
aiming to transform Soviet television from a dull, government-controlled
system to a system (based upon the Western model) where, in addition to
providing entertainment, television provides a forum for discussion and
debate. Part III examines the changes in 1991 which signal the return of
Soviet television to its past. Finally, Part IV discusses the future of tele-
vision and the law in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ("USSR").
This part proposes that Soviet law must provide greater freedom of
speech to Soviet television and the tie between the State and the broad-
casting media must be further severed. If the Soviet Union is to change
- from a dictatorial system in which all information is tightly controlled
and sanitized by the State to a democratic system in which the people are
allowed to hear different points of view - Soviet television must lead the
way.
II. SOVIET TELEVISION AND THE LAW IN
THE PRE-GORBACHEV ERA
A. Lenin's Legacy
The Soviet Union is the largest country in the world, spanning two
continents and eleven time zones.13 Television has been an important
tool in keeping the country unified. ' 4 In 1940, there were only 400 televi-
sion sets in the country. By 1976, Soviet industry was producing seven
million television sets annually.' 5 In 1960, only five percent of the Soviet
11. See infra text accompanying note 201.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 235-52.
13. E. MICKEWICZ, supra note 1, at 186.
14. According to one western expert on Soviet television, "The vastness of the country and
its areas of inaccessible terrain are simply leapfrogged by the use of communications satellites
... that bring national television programming to all eleven time zones." Id. at 186.
Dr. Mickewicz describes an installment of a British television documentary which "fol-
lows the life of a fur trapper in remote Siberia. He is out of reach of all government controls
and contact, it appears, but he relies on television." Id. at 227, n. 7 (emphasis in original).
15. E. MICKEWICZ, supra note 1, at 3.
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public was watching television; by 1986, 93% of the Soviet population
were television viewers. 16 Surveys conducted in the late 1970's show that
98% of Soviet factory workers watched television daily.17 According to
a Soviet source, "[T]he necessity for families to acquire a television set
today is so great that it is seen as an object of the first necessity. Its
presence can be classified as an inelastic type of utility." 8 Watching tele-
vision is the third most frequent activity in the Soviet Union, after work-
ing and sleeping.' 9 A Western scholar conclusively states that television
"has become the preeminent medium of mass communication [in the So-
viet Union]." 20
Television did not exist during Lenin's rule. Lenin, however, is di-
rectly responsible for the widespread popularity of television in the
USSR, since later Soviet political rulers applied Lenin's political and
legal theories for the written mass media to television.
In his early work, What Is To Be Done?, Lenin set out the principle
that the Communists should indoctrinate the people to a new Commu-
nist mentality.2" Lenin urged his common followers to use the mass me-
dia for this purpose.22 The Bolsheviks, therefore, very early began using
the mass media to instill the "correct view" into the citizenry. The task
of the mass media (at that time newspapers and journals) was not to
provide news to the reader, but to give the reader a correct interpretation
of the news.23 The job of the Communist newspaper Pravda, despite its
16. Id
17. Id. at 205.
18. Id. at 204 (quoting SEMYA I BLAGOSOSTOYANIE V RAZVITOM SoTsIALISTICHESKOM
OBSHCHESTVE (Family and Well-Being in Developed Socialist Society) 204-05 (N.M.
Rimashevskaya and S.A. Karapetyan, Moscow 1985)).
19. E. MICKEWICZ, supra note 1, at 204. As in the West, "[y]oung children are now part
of the Soviet 'television generation,' watching at least as many hours as they spend in school."
Id. Undoubtedly, the amount of television viewing time by children and young adults will
increase as Soviet television presents more western-type entertainment programs and in-
troduces more television channels, including cable television. Cf infra note 265 (24 hour
transmission of MTV comes to the Soviet Union).
20. E. MICKEWICZ, supra note 1, at 204 (emphasis added). Dr. Mickewicz ironically
notes that "the 'new Soviet man' [a term coined by Marxist/Leninist political scholars] is now
in front of the television set, and so is the rest of the family." Id. See also Mass Culture, supra
note 1, at 190-91.
21. THE OTHER SIDE, supra note 1, at 53 (quoting V.I. LENIN, WHAT IS To BE DONE?
67, 157-60 (Int'l. Pub. ed. 1969)). See also E. MICKEWICZ, supra note 1, at 27-28, 180, 213.
According to one western scholar, Lenin's treatise, published in 1902, is "still the operational
code of the [Soviet] media system." Id. at 184.
22. E. MICKEWICZ, supra note 1, at 27-28, 213.
23. See THE OTHER SIDE, supra note 1, at 52 (discussing Soviet version of "correct" inter-
pretation of "facts"); E. MICKEWICZ, supra note 1, at 26-30 (discussing the "Soviet under-
standing of 'newsworthy'").
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title,24 was not to provide the truth, but to convince the reader about the
proper interpretation of the truth.
As the first leader of the Soviet state, Lenin constructed a media
apparatus directed by, and subordinate to, the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union. According to Lenin:
Let there be ten times less newspaper material devoted to so-
called current news, but let us have distributed in hundreds of
thousands of million of copies, a press that acquaints the whole
population with the exemplary achievement of affairs in a few
state labor communes which surpass the others .... [T]hat is
what should form the main content of our Soviet press.25
A second task of the mass media, according to Lenin, was to inte-
grate the many different nationalities of the Soviet Union into one social-
ist and unified state.26 To reach the people through the newspaper, the
Soviet population had to be able to read. For this reason, a mass literacy
campaign was begun. In 1920, approximately 60% of the Soviet popula-
tion was illiterate; by 1979 that proportion was only three-tenths of one
percent. 7
B. The Stalin Era
Before there was television in the Soviet Union, there was radio.
After the Bolshevik Revolution and through Stalin's rule, the Soviets en-
couraged their people to purchase radios. 28  The Communist rulers
spread party messages throughout the vast country not only through oral
agitation, but also through two sources of mass media, newspapers and
radio. Stalin made radio production a high priority, and his successors
followed suit. By 1979, there was one radio for every two persons in the
Soviet Union.29
Lenin, especially in the early 1920s during the years of the New
Economic Policy, allowed private, non-Party newspapers and journals to
coexist with the Bolshevik media apparatus. During Lenin's time pub-
24. The word "pravda" in Russian means "truth." The other major, Soviet nationwide
newspaper is Izvestia, the Russian word for "news." A popular Soviet joke holds that "there is
no truth in Pravda and no news in Izvestia."
25. McNair, supra note 1, at 328 (quoting Lenin, Lenin About the Press 332 (M. Saifulin,
ed. (1972)). Gorbachev's views of the media are apparently similar to Lenin's. See E. MICK-
EWICZ, supra note 1, at 213.
26. McNair, supra note 1, at 328 (quoting Lenin, Lenin About the Press 332 (M. Saifulin,
ed. (1972)).
27. E. MICKEWICZ, supra note 1, at 185-86.
28. Id, at 17.
29. Id.
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lished criticism of Party policy and of laws themselves also appeared.3 °
Stalin, upon coming to power, began to strike against dissent in the
mass media. By 1929, "there was not a single non-Party publication left
nor any private publishing houses that could have served as vehicles for
opposition views."' 31 Criticism of Stalin and the Communist Party was
banned. The Soviet media truly became an instrument of the Party. At
the same time, even non-political events which cast the Soviet Union in a
bad light were not reported. From the 1930s to the mid-1980s - for
more than 50 years - the Soviet Union was described by the Soviet mass
media as a land of full employment, no homelessness, free medical care
and nationalistic brotherhood among all the Soviet peoples. Unlike the
rest of the world, in the Soviet Union, at least in the eyes of the media,
airplanes did not crash, ships did not sink, and natural disasters never
occurred.32
C. The Early Age of Soviet Television
Television came to the Soviet Union in the 1940s.33 At first, many
television programs were broadcast only locally, since it was impossible
to transmit programs from one region of the Soviet Union to another.34
In 1957, the USSR State Committee for Radio and Television was
formed. The Committee held an exclusive monopoly for control of radio
and television in the USSR. 35 One aim in creating the national Commit-
tee was to wrest control of radio and television programming from local
authorities. Ideological uniformity over the airwaves now could become
possible, as the Communist Party began to exercise control of all radio
and television stations throughout the vast country.
In the 1960s, however, local programming still dominated the televi-
sion airwaves. Many of the local broadcasts were not even in Russian,
but in the native local language. 36 A concern about an increase in na-
tionalism, as a result of local programming, led the Communist rulers to
further centralize the broadcasting media. In 1970, a central decree put a
more centralized system of programming into force 7.3  The decree gave
30. McNair, supra note 1, at 329.
31. Id. at 239 (quoting R. MEDVEDEV, LET HISTORY JUDGE 187 (1971)).
32. Id. at 330.
33. Experimental television broadcasts began in Moscow in 1931 and in 1934, the first
television transmission with sound was made in the Soviet Union. Regular transmissions be-
gan in March 1939. B. PAULU, BROADCASTING IN EASTERN EUROPE 36-7 (1974).
34. Id. at 34.
35. Id. at 16, 228.
36. Id. at 6.
37. Id.
[Vol. I I
SOVIET ENTERTAINMENT LAW
the television heads in Moscow ultimate control over both national and
local broadcasting.3" Individual television studios in every Soviet city
now had to take their orders from Moscow.3 9 According to a Soviet
writer, with the 1970 Decree, "the [central] Party took the entire respon-
sibility for the political, ideological, [and] artistic level of television
programs."'
The 1973 Decree also placed television before radio in the title of
governmental administrative body controlling radio and television. That
body now became the "USSR State Committee for Television and Radio
Broadcasting" or more popularly by its Russian language acronym,
Gosteleradio4
By launching its first communications satellite in the mid-1960s, the
Soviet Union guaranteed that the bureaucrats in Moscow would have
complete control over television broadcasting. 2 For the first time in So-
viet history, information could be instantaneously transmitted to almost
every home in the vast country. Mass, one-way visual communication
had finally come to the Soviet Union. According to a Western scholar:
Radio, which the Soviets developed in a crash program right
after the Bolshevik Revolution, did not reach the entire popula-
tion, and people who read newspapers (especially the national
ones) tended always to be among the better educated. . . . But
with the advent of television, virtually total saturation of the
population could, for the first time, be assured. That meant
people of all age groups and all levels of education would be the
38. B. PAULU, BROADCASTING IN EASTERN EUROPE 6 (1974).
39. Id. at 25.
40. Id. at 6 (quoting V.V. EGOROV, TELEVIDENIE I ZRITEL 45 (Television and the
Viewer) (1977). A Western journalist describes Soviet television before Gorbachev as follows:
Only two channels broadcast nationwide cross the eleven time zones .... Minority
republics and important regional centers. . . were allowed for a few hours a week to
broadcast local programming which was heavy on folklore and native costumes. In
other words, it was a dull wasteland in the early 1970s, so insufferably dull that a
Soviet diplomat, back home after a stint in Washington, admitted to me that his
eleven-year old son, having become accustomed to American TV, was bored out of
his wits with Soviet programming and had become practically unmanageable.
H. SMITH, supra note 1, at 162.
Smith relates the following Soviet joke, popular during the Brezhnev era, which illustrates
both the political structure and lack of variety of television viewing in the USSR: "A viewer
tuned in to find, on the first program, Brezhnev delivering a windy speech. He switched to the
second program: again, Brezhnev droning on. On the third program, a uniformed officer
pointed a gun at the viewer and ordered: 'Comrade, go back to channel one.'" Id.
41. E. MICKEWICZ, supra note 1, at 6; see also Mass Culture, supra note 1, at 191. One
western journalist describes Gosteleradio as "one of the stalest, most centralized monopolies of
the Soviet state." H. SMITH, supra note 2, at 162.
42. E. MICKEWICZ, supra note 1, at 4, 13-16.
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recipients of standardized messages, and the transmission of
these messages would take place with unheard-of speed, reach-
ing everyone nearly simultaneously. That kind of public in
those numbers have never been seen before in Soviet mass
media.43
A national television network called the First Program or Central
Broadcast (Pervaya Programa) began operations in 1960.' Pervaya
Programa originates from the Central Television Studios in Moscow, and
is shown throughout the USSR. Local television stations are prohibited
from changing or interfering with the transmission of Pervaya Programa
nationwide programs.45 A 1984 statement to the local television studios
stated: "[T]he most important social-political programs of central broad-
casts such as the television program Vremya [the nation's evening news
program 'Time'] . .. must not be 'covered' by local broadcasts."'
In 1982, a second national television network, called the Second
Program (Ftaraya Programa), came into existence.47 The audience for
Ftaraya Programa is less than half the audience for the Pervaya
Programa.4" In the eyes of the central administrators of Moscow, the
Second Program is considered not as important as the First Program.
For this reason its shows are not as current or interesting, and may even
be repeats of the First Program.49 Local television studios are also more
likely to insert local programming into the Second Program than into the
First Program.5'
In 1965, Moscow residents received their own television channel,
now called the Third Program (Tretiia Programa) in Moscow. 5' Tretiia
Programa is an educational channel and broadcasts sometimes practical,
but most often ideological and political instruction.5 2 In 1967, Moscow
received another channel, the Fourth Program (Chetviortaya Programa),
43. Id. at 4.
44. Id at 5. In 1967, the new National Television Center, with a 1,750 foot tower, began
operations in Ostankino, a Moscow suburb. The Ostankino Television Center is still opera-
tional today.
45. Id.
46. E. MICKEWICZ, supra note 1, at 5. In 1985, the head of Gosteleradio estimated that
ninety percent of Soviet television consider "Vremya" their main source of information. Id. at
32. That figure is astounding.
47. Id. at 5-6, 7-8.
48. Id. at 7.
49. Id. at 8.
50. Id.
51. E. MICKEWICZ, supra note 1, at 9.
52. Id.
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which broadcasts in the evenings.53 Finally, Muscovites now receive the
Leningrad television channel.54
Unlike the West, a large share of television programming in the So-
viet Union is political or educational, with a heavy emphasis on the polit-
ical. According to one Western study: "Fully 41% of the entire week we
surveyed was devoted to news and public affairs. News and news analy-
sis is firmly fixed at 20% of each weekday's television airtime." 5 To
avoid the unexpected, very few television programs were broadcast live
until recently.56
Even today, television remains almost exclusively a state-controlled
and highly centralized enterprise.57 At the Communist Party level, the
Party Central Committee's Department of Propaganda sets the ideology
and central plan for all mass media, including television.5" At the gov-
ernmental level, Gosteleradio exercises day-to-day control over all televi-
sion broadcasting.59
Until recently, Soviet television commentators were paid Party
propagandists, rather than western style television journalists. Their role
could be likened to official government spokesmen found in the West."
As a result, the Soviet dissident historian Roy Medvedev was able to
claim in 1977 that the Soviet people are:
[I]l1-informed on the simplest level about things going on in
their own country and are even more ignorant about events in
the world at large. The overwhelming majority of Soviet citi-
zens have no available means of finding things out; besides be-
ing a source of irritation, this also results in a extremely
distorted view of the world.61
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 151 (emphasis in original). See also id. at 154 ("pie chart" illustrating weekly
programming for Soviet television).
56. See infra text accompanying note 78.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 127-32.
58. E. MIcKEWICZ, supra note 1, at 22.
59. See supra text following note 41. For discussion of the 1991 reorganization plan for
Gosteleradio see infra text accompanying notes 228-32.
60. See e.g. THE OTHER SIDE, supra note 1, at 57 (U.S. Presidential spokesman accusing
Soviet television commentator Vladimir Pozner of being "a trained propagandist for the Soviet
Union [and] whose concept of truth is whatever statement will advance Communist objec-
tives"). For Pozner's autobiography and his view of Soviet television see V. POZNER, LET
HISTORY JUDGE (1990).
61. R. MEDVEDEV, ON SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY 202 (1977), cited and quoted in McNair,
supra note 1, at 331.
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III. SOVIET TELEVISION AND GORBACHEV'S INFORMATION
REVOLUTION
Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in March, 1985, when he as-
sumed the role of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the So-
viet Union.62 One month later, at the April Plenum of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party, Gorbachev launched the campaign
of glasnost, or openness, promising a new information policy for the So-
viet Union.63 At the plenum, Gorbachev assured the Soviet people that,
with the help of the mass media, they will be given the truth rather than
a sanitized version of events. 6 Gorbachev even promised to fill in the
"blank spots" of Soviet history.65 No longer would the Soviet Union be a
country with an unpredictable past.
Running concurrently with the campaign of glasnost came per-
estroika, the process of restructuring or privatizing the Soviet economy."
Unlike glasnost, perestroika had little influence over the mass media at
first. Television, along with radio and newspapers, remained in govern-
ment hands. By the late 1980s, however, critics (both inside and outside
the government) began to call for at least partial privatization of the mass
media.67 Nevertheless, glasnost, rather than perestroika, was the catalyst
for the information revolution in Soviet mass media. Many times, televi-
sion programming was at the forefront of the revolution.
A. Glasnost and the Television Reforms
Gorbachev's information revolution, however, had a inauspicious
start. In a February, 1986 speech to the 27th Party Congress, Gorbachev
stated that "Central Committee sees [the mass media] as an instrument
of creation and an expression of the Party's general viewpoint."6 This
continuing connection between the mass media and the Party was con-
firmed two months later during the April, 1986 disaster at the Chernobyl
62. See generally Moscow's New Boss: Younger, Smoother and Probably Formidable, TIME,
Mar. 25, 1985.
63. McNair, supra note 1, at 327. For an interview of a leading Soviet journalist discuss-
ing Gorbachev's media reforms see Gardner, The Media Under Gorbachev, 42 J. INr'L. AFF.
357 (1989) (interview with Vitalii Korotich, editor-in-chief of "Ogoniok" Magazine).
64. McNair, supra note 1, at 327.
65. Id.
66. See generally Bazyler, Making Profits From Perestroika: Soviet Economic Reform and
New Trade Opportunities in the Gorbachev Era, 11 WHrrIER L. REV. 323 (1989).
67. See e.g. H. SMITH, supra note 1, at 150-51 (statements of Bella Kurkova, executive
editor of "Leningrad's most daring television program"); id. at 161-62 (statements of Siberian
party officials and television executives); id. at 172 (statements of television producers of Mos-
cow's radical television program, "Vzglyad").
68. THE OTHER SIDE, supra note 1, at 55.
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nuclear reactor complex. 69 As the world was experiencing its greatest
nuclear accident, Soviet television remained silent. Three days later an
announcer on the evening national news program read a terse twenty-
four word bulletin stating that a nuclear reactor was damaged at
Chernobyl. The bulletin was not given any prominence, and no photo-
graphs accompanied the story.7 ° It took Gorbachev eight days to finally
appear on television and address the nation. Even during his television
address, Gorbachev spent most of his time attacking the West for exag-
gerating the effects of the accident and linking the Chernobyl disaster to
upcoming talks on arms control with the United States.
7 1
Slowly, however, Soviet mass media coverage of the disaster in-
creased. Television reporters were allowed on the scene and actual foot-
age of the damaged Chernobyl plant appeared on Soviet television.72
According to a western analyst,
Chernobyl was probably a watershed for the Soviet media. A
policy of responsiveness and openness that had never really
been tested and was only gradually being introduced was sud-
denly in the center of national and international attention.
Chernobyl accelerated the implementation of the new media
policy beyond what had been anticipated or agreed to. The
early decisions conformed to cautious ... policy; the later deci-
sions took a bolder approach and parted with tradition.73
In May, 1986, Pravda published an article accusing the main televi-
sion news program Vremya of stale and one-sided coverage.
The most important factor in the effectiveness of information is
timeliness .... Often it happens that the greater the occasion
for timeliness, the less chance that it will be conveyed by televi-
sion. This relates to both the domestic and the international
parts of the broadcast .... One doesn't sense in the program
the 'nerves' of current day 'a few hours ago ... ' 'we just re-
ceived this communication ....
Pravda went on to accuse television news of providing unfair coverage of
the West.
The information about the capitalist world is monotonous. The
69. See E. MICKEWICZ, supra note 1, at 60-68; THE OTHER SIDE, supra note 1, at 55;
McNair, supra note 1, at 332-33.
70. E. MICKEWICZ, supra note 1, at 62.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 62-63.
73. E. MICKEWICZ, supra note 1, at 64-66.
74. E. MICKEWICZ, supra note 1, at 68. See also McNair, supra note 1, at 333, (discussing
the May, 1986 PRAVDA article.)
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journalists' cliches migrate from broadcast to broadcast. Many
of them show political meetings, demonstrations, and protests.
Rarely do they discuss the achievements of science or technol-
ogy, about how, under conditions of capitalism, they turn out
for simple workers, about economic and cultural collaboration,
about problems of women, old people, the growth of crime and
terrorism in the Western world, about the problems and suc-
cesses of the socialist countries.75
Shortly thereafter television programming began to change. In
springtime of 1986, Gosteleradio gave Vremya a "facelift."'7 6 That same
year, the Soviets began using television satellites for "space bridges" be-
tween Soviet and American television audiences.77 More programs be-
gan to be broadcast live.78  Soviet television also began to show the
positive achievements of the West. A television documentary lauded the
success of McDonald's, showing the fast, friendly service Americans re-
ceive when they eat out, in contrast to the slow and rude restaurant ser-
vice in the Soviet Union.79
"Critical television" now became in demand. Throughout 1987 and
1988, Soviet television broadcast numerous 60 Minutes-type expos6s on
corruption both within the government and the Party. Most often, the
75. E. MICKEWICZ, supra note 1, at 68.
76. Id. at 147. Soviet television traditionally suffers from the "talking heads" syndrome of
programs which televise individuals either talking directly to the audience or to each other.
According to one western study, on Vremya, "the anchor alone reading the news, takes up, on
the average, over a quarter of the entire news broadcast, in contrast to a mere 6 percent for
[television news on the American television network] ABC." Id. at 123. (emphasis in
original).
The format for presentations of stories also is different from American televi-
sion. The transition from one story to the next on Vremya is sometimes slow ....
Transitions may also be rather abrupt; there is almost never a leadout (the correspon-
dent's practice of identifying himself or herself at the end of the story and inviting the
viewer back to the studio) and stories simply end. Sometimes a number of stories
will follow one another, without introduction by the anchor. The viewer knows that
change has taken place by the change in correspondent and locale.
Id. at 148-49.
77. For a detailed description of a 1986 "space bridge" program between Seattle and Le-
ningrad see E. MICKEWICZ, supra note 1, at 43-48. The program was hosted by Phil Donahue
in the United States and well-known Soviet commentator Vladimir Pozner in the Soviet
Union. See, POZNER, supra note 60.
78. According to one western writer, "[T]he shift in programming policy to hire [televi-
sion] broadcasts is one of the hallmarks of the Gorbachev era." E. MICKEWiCZ, supra note 1,
at 9. See also Mass Culture, supra note 1, at 192.
79. The McDonald's broadcast on Soviet television was widely discussed in both the Soviet
Union and in the United States. For one description, see E. MICKEWICZ, supra note 1, at 75.
Interestingly, in 1990, McDonald's opened its first outlet in the Soviet Union, in central
Moscow.
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exposes would accuse some local officials of waste and corruption.'s
The Soviet television public could not believe what it was seeing.
For the first time in Soviet history the mass media, with Soviet television
leading the way, publicized what was wrong rather than what was right
in the country. Opinions which in the past could lead to imprisonment,
banishment, or even death were regularly expressed on television news
programs.81
The mass media, however, was still bound by two taboos. First,
while it could criticize local government and Party officials, criticism of
the top national leadership, especially Gorbachev, was forbidden. Sec-
ond, the media could mention Lenin, the god-like founder of the Soviet
state, only in laudatory terms.
In 1988 and 1989, television broke both these taboos. In June, 1988,
Pervaya Programa aired gavel-to-gavel coverage of the session of the na-
tional legislature, the Supreme Soviet. 2 For the first time in Soviet his-
tory, Soviet citizens saw their legislators on live television debate each
other and criticize the people in power. Given the television spotlight,
numerous Supreme Soviet deputies rose to criticize the handling of the
country by Gorbachev and his closest advisors.8 3
The taboo against criticism of Lenin was broken in 1989. In April,
1989, theater director Mark Zakhrov on the late night live program Vzg-
lyad (Viewpoint) 4 remarked that Lenin's body ought to be removed
from the mausoleum and buried in a normal fashion. Even though Zak-
hrov was not criticizing Lenin directly, but only proposing that Lenin's
body be given a decent burial, his comments created an outrage. Alexan-
der Aksanov, then head of Gosteleradio, was forced to resign for al-
lowing such comments to be made on television. 5 Soon afterwards,
criticism of Lenin, however mild, began to appear on some of the most
80. E. MICKEWICZ, supra note 1, at 111-12, 215.
81. THE OTHER SIDE, supra note 1, at 75.
82. In a 1989 article, most likely written earlier, Dr. Brian McNair of the University of
Ulster correctly predicted the change in Soviet television:
A very limited number of taboo areas remain sheltered from the critical attention of
journalists, most notably direct criticism of the General Secretary and of the founder
of the state, Lenin. The time cannot be far off, however, when even these remaining
'sacred cows' of Marxism-Leninism can be considered legitimate subjects of critical
glasnost.
McNair, supra note 1, at 334.
83. Mass Culture, supra note 1, at 198.
84. For an interesting description of how the Vzglyad program came into existence see H.
SMITH, supra note 1, at 165-72. For descriptions of the Vzglyad program on Lenin, see H.
SMITH, supra note 1, at 169; Mass Culture, supra note 1, at 193.
85. H. SMITH, supra note 1, at 170; Mass Culture, supra note 1, at 193.
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radical television programs.86 While Gorbachev blamed Stalin and then
Brezhnev for the failures of Soviet society, some Soviet television com-
mentators and their guests suggested that Lenin's original policies may
have planted the seeds for the political dictatorship and economic stagna-
tion that occurred after Lenin's death.8 7
In 1988, television stations in various Soviet republics also began
asserting more independence. According to one Western scholar, "In the
summer of 1988, nationalist movements in the Baltic republics of Lithua-
nia, Estonia and Latvia were practically born on television discussion
shows. In Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and elsewhere, the spark of
nationalism was spread by regional television. '"8 As the independence
movements in the Baltic republics gained political power, their television
stations began airing programs supporting secession from the Soviet
Union. Georgian television also became known for its independence.89
Even in Leningrad, the bulwark of traditional Communism, television
played a major role in ousting the former Party stalwarts from power.90
Its popular news magazine, Fifth Wheel (Ptatoye Koleso) showed epi-
sodes that included an expos6 of the KGB and an interview with one of
Stalin's former executioners, who explained in meticulous detail how he
carried out Stalin's orders.9
The most controversial program, however, became Vzglyad, the late
night music and information show on Pervaya Programa.92 The inter-
views on Vzglyad were conducted live. Because the program was aired at
almost midnight, the show began to handle topics untouched by the
other mass media. Eventually, Vzglyad became the second most popular
program on Soviet television, trailing only the main evening news pro-
gram, Vremya.
93
By mid-1989, all of the old prohibitions had seemed to be broken.
Soviet television not only would feature programs criticizing the Soviet
rulers, but would discuss such long-banned topics as homelessness, crimi-
86. H. SMITH, supra note 1, at 170.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 161.
89. Mass Culture, supra note 1, at 194. "In Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and elsewhere,
the spark of nationalism was spread by regional television." H. SMITH, supra note 1, at 161.
90. H. SMITH, supra note 1, at 147-53, 158-65.
91. Id. at 155-56.
92. For a discussion of Vzglyad see H. SMITH, supra note 1, at 165-71. "Shock is its trade-
mark. Since it began on October 2, 1987, Vzglyad has broken more taboos and more exclusives
than any other show on television." Id. at 165.
93. Id. at 165.
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nal statistics, religion, and homosexuality.94 The entertainment portion
of Soviet television also began to change. "T.V. programming [now] in-
clude[d] topical talk shows, fashion parades, game shows, film clips of
Western stars from the Beatles to Bruce Springsteen and even an occa-
sional beauty contest." Shows featuring violence and sex began to ap-
pear. By late 1990, Soviet television featured scenes of sex and violence
that could not be shown on the broadcast television channels in the
United States.
B. The Legal Reforms
As Soviet television began to change dramatically, liberal television
journalists began calling for new laws to institutionalize the changes tak-
ing place. It became apparent that the laws on the books no longer re-
flected the actual reality. Soviet television producers casually ignored
censorship regulations long ago imposed upon them. 96
1. The July 15, 1990 Television Decree
On July 15, 1990, Gorbachev, as part of the power given to him by
the Supreme Soviet to rule by decree, issued the "USSR President's De-
cree on Democratization and Development of Television and Radio
Broadcasting in the USSR."97 The aim of the Decree was to free radio
and television from the Communist Party apparatus. The Decree gave
local governments, other political parties and public organizations access
to the airwaves. While the Decree contains many caveats, according to
one Soviet television producer, it signals "the end of monopoly of televi-
sion in the Soviet Union ... [c]ompetition has started and the viewers
will win."98
Because it is a general decree issued by the President of the USSR,
rather than a law passed by the Soviet parliament, the Decree fails to
specify the changes that should come about in television broadcasting.
94. For a discussion of the limits of glasnost as they pertain to the mass media, see H.
SMITH, supra note 1, at 158-61.
95. Id. at 163.
96. Id. at 153-58.
97. For the text of the decree see Appendix 1 [hereinafter "TV Decree, July, 1990."] For
discussion of Gorbachev's power to rule by decree see "Government By Decree," Soviet Ana-
lyst, Feb. 6, 1991, at 1. For a good discussion of the effect of the decree on privatization of
Soviet television see Shogren, Glasnost Update: Gorbachev Unchained Soviet Radio and TV
but fledgling Capitalists Have to Scramble For the Money to Invest in their Media Projects,"
L.A. Times, Oct. 9, 1990 at Fl, col. 5 ("husband and wife TV team dream of becoming the
Roone Arledge and Diane Sawyer of Soviet television").
98. Shogren, supra note 97, at F5, col. 1.
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Considering what it aims to accomplish, the Decree is very short, con-
taining only a preamble and five articles.
The Preamble begins by acknowledging that "[tlelevision and radio
are the largest mediums of the media for information, propaganda, and
education."99 Moreover, the Preamble recognizes that television and ra-
dio programs "to a large extent form public opinion and people's feel-
ings."'" Surprisingly, the Preamble makes no mention for the need of
greater freedom of speech and public debate on television and radio.
There is only a brief reference to "the democratization of society."' 0 '
Instead, the Preamble speaks in conservative terms. It states that "it is
particularly important that television and radio should fully promote the
consolidation of society; strengthen its stability and tranquility and se-
cure the protection of state interests, the humanization of relations
among people, law and order, and inter-ethnic concord."' 2
Article One of the Decree is short. Speaking in anticipatory terms,
it merely proposes that the USSR Supreme Soviet "adopt a law on the
USSR regulating the activity of television and radio broadcasting in the
country and determining the status and competence of [Gosteler-
adio]."' °3 To date, the Supreme Soviet has not adopted such a law.
Article Two of the Decree proposes the expansion of the rights and
powers of the republic and local television and radio committees. This
clause contains the most important language of the Decree. It states:
"[S]oviets of People's Deputies at all levels, public organizations, and
parties have the right to open new television and radio centers or studios
from their own financial and technical resources, or by means of leasing
air time and a technical means of broadcasting from [Gosteleradio] and
the USSR Ministry of Communications."'" In effect this clause pro-
vides for the first time in Soviet history the existence of private television
stations. The legal requirements for the creation of a private television
enterprise are amazingly simple: the Decree merely mandates that these
new private television centers and studios be registered.'0 5 Unfortu-
nately, the Decree fails to specify whether government authorities at the
national or republican levels, or both, have the power to issue such regis-
tration licenses.
The simple legal requirement of registration hides a very practical
99. TV Decree, preamble (July, 1990).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. TV Decree, art. 1 (July, 1990).
104. Id. at art. 2.
105. Id.
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but very difficult requirement, now imposed by this clause. The right to
create a new television station or broadcast new, independent television
programs is given only to those who can afford to do so "from their own
financial and technical resources, or by means of leasing air time [from
the state]."" In effect, the Decree states that if "you want to play the
television game, you must pay for it yourself. The State will not finance
or subsidize your private venture." As will be discussed below, today in
the USSR private individuals do not have the financial resources to oper-
ate private television channels or lease air time from the State. For this
reason, there has been no rush of registrants clamoring to open private
television studios in the USSR since the Decree's passage.
Article Two also contains an important restriction: It deems "inva-
lid any acts on the part of republican [and local] organs adopted without
agreement with the USSR Council of Ministers"' 7 if these acts are "di-
rected at change in the legal and property position of the functioning
subdivisions of [Gosteleradio]." 10 This provision aims to prevent the
various republics seeking independence from the Soviet Union from tak-
ing over existing television stations from the central government. °9
Article Three of the Decree enunciates the important concept that
state television and radio broadcasting functions "should be implemented
independently of political and public organizations."' 10 Therefore, while
the Decree recognizes the near monopoly of the State in television and
radio broadcasting, it confirms that the state radio and television chan-
nels should not be mere tools of the State or the Communist Party.11
This clause contemplates state-owned television and radio channels simi-
lar to those existing in the West. While the television station may be
government owned or subsidized, the government permits the station to
exercise journalistic freedom. 2 The British Broadcasting Service in the
United Kingdom and the Public Broadcasting Service in the United
States are good examples of such public but journalistically independent
television systems. I 3
The third article aims to break Communist Party control of the elec-
tronic mass media by stating:
The monopolization of air time by one or another party, polit-
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. TV Decree, art. 2 (July, 1990)
109. See infra text accompanying note 201.
110. TV Decree, art. 3 (July, 1990)
111. Id.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 260-63.
113. Id.
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ical current, or group is impermissible, as is the conversion of
state television and radio broadcasting into a means of dissemi-
nating the private political views of its staff.114
In actuality, the last phrase restricts journalistic freedom by prohib-
iting dissemination of the private political views of television and radio
commentators who, rather than strictly reporting the news, may wish to
state their personal opinions. Most likely, the prohibition against editori-
als is aimed at television journalists who have used television air time to
criticize the Gorbachev government. 115
Article Four of the Decree directs Gosteleradio to "carry out a
reorganization of its activity for the fuller and free manifestation of the
creative potential of its employees and strengthening democratic princi-
ples." 6 This clause also directs Gosteleradio "[t]o switch to a competi-
tive contract system of work agreements" and to provide "opportunities
of self-financing for individual sections [of Gosteleradio]." ' 7 The clause
also speaks of creating "official rates of pay, taking into account the state
of its finances" in order to carry out for "profit... commercial activ-
ity."' 18 In effect, this section aims to make Gosteleradio into a self-sup-
porting, commercially competitive state organization that would carry
on its activities for profit. Read together with Article Two which allows
Gosteleradio to lease its facilities and air time, this clause contemplates
that independent organizations and private entities would pay a competi-
tive rate to Gosteleradio. As mentioned above, however, the creation of
a competitive "for-profit" system imposes an insurmountable burden on
independent producers and entrepreneurs seeking to open private televi-
sion stations. Since Gosteleradio controls almost all the television stu-
dios and production facilities in the Soviet Union, the rates they can
charge for use of such studios and facilities effectively prohibits competi-
tion from the private sector.
To date, in fact, financial considerations have kept private individu-
als and companies off the television airwaves. The only new channel in
114. TV Decree, art. 3 (July, 1990). Prior to Gorbachev, the electronic mass media was
under complete control of the Communist Party.
115. See e.g., Shogren, supra note 97, at F3, col. I. Also, the term "private political views"
is vague. A reporter may not know where the line is crossed from news reporting ("fact") to
dissemination of private political views ("opinion").
116. TV Decree, art. 4 (July, 1990).
117. Id. The clause is vague. Since the State owns almost all television studios and equip-
ment, with whom is the State to compete?
118. Id Prior to the Decree, all Soviet media, including Gosteleradio, were not considered
"commercial enterprises, but state-owned and operated instructional vehicles." E. MICK-
EWICZ, supra note 1, at 29.
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Moscow is the so-called "Superchannel." 9  The Superchannel is the
first commercial channel in the history of Soviet television. However, its
owner is Gosteleradio, which in effect is the State, but operates it purely
as a commercial venture. 12 Gosteleradio sells both time for commercials
and also air time to independent producers for their own television pro-
grams. Almost all of the programming is entertainment, with little polit-
ical content. 12 ' To obtain precious hard currency, Gosteleradio has sold
air time on the Superchannel to foreign entities.122 However, since Gos-
teleradio has complete discretion as to what programs it will allow on the
Superchannel, foreign producers have avoided political topics on their
programs in order to keep them on the air.
123
Article Five of the Decree, the final clause, speaks of the "necessity
for the construction of a [Russian Republic] television ... studio com-
plex in Moscow City."'1 24 The clause also contemplates that, as part of
the Soviet program for converting Soviet defense industries to non-mili-
tary purposes, the new Soviet space satellite systems "Gelikon" and
"Energia" will be used to increase the number of television and radio
channels throughout the Soviet Union.
125
Both of these proposals have yet to be brought into effect. As long
as Gorbachev's archrival, Boris Yeltsin, remains President of the Russian
Republic,' 26 it is doubtful that the national government will allow the
Russian Republic to have its own television complex. To date, the "Ge-
likon" and "Energia" systems have not been used to improve television
broadcasting in remote regions of the USSR.
The July 15, 1990 Decree is a good first step toward creating a legal
basis for competitive television and alternate programming in the Soviet
Union. The Decree, however, contains undue legal restrictions.
First, the new Decree gives too much control to Gosteleradio. Ac-
cording to would-be independent Soviet producer Sasha Kuznetsov,
"[tihe law is against us. [B]efore the Decree the television producer had
in effect three bosses: Gosteleradio, regional Soviet [council] and the city
119. B. Kalvov, Goluboii Ekran v Seruiu Polosku, (Green Lines on the Blue Screen) Kom-
somolskaiia Pravda, Dec. 25, 1990, at 4, col. 8.
120. Id.
121. One of the co-authors hosts a program on the Superchannel. Since this information is
not published, it comes from personal knowledge.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. TV Decree, art. 5 (July, 1990).
125. Id.
126. See infra text accompanying notes 213-16. See generally Russia's Maverick- Boris
Yeltsin, The Bad Boy Of Soviet Politics Battles Gorbachev In A Crucial Vote This Week, TIME,
March 25, 1991 at 27.
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soviet [council]."' 2 7 According to Kuznetsov "three bosses were eas-
ier"' 28 because authority was diffused. Now "the station is only under
the hand of Gosteleradio, which can be very heavy. We are still free
right now, but once Gosteleradio realizes its new power, that freedom
might be taken away."' 29 Therefore, television stations still have no in-
dependent legal status in the Soviet Union.
Second, the limits imposed by the Decree upon local governments
also bar alternative programming over local television channels. In its
strictest sense, the Decree outlaws any acts taken by local governments
without permission from Gosteleradio. One Leningrad producer com-
mented, "this effectively takes away Leningrad television from the city of
Leningrad."' 30 Essentially, the Decree aims to prevent radical govern-
ments in the Baltic republics, the Caucauses, and, most important, in the
cities of Moscow and Leningrad, from airing programs on television con-
trary to interests of the central government.1
3 '
Third, requiring local governments, political parties and public and
private organizations to pay broadcast costs prevents these cash-starved
Soviet organizations from having their own shows. Producers of an ex-
isting television show owned by Gosteleradio who want to go independ-
ent have an additional problem: the now independent producers will
need to buy their own equipment instead of using state-owned television
equipment. Independent producers, however, rarely have sufficient ru-
bles or hard currency to purchase expensive technical equipment. There-
fore, producers of television shows currently shown on the air remain
slaves of Gosteleradio. As explained by one Soviet producer, "it was
easy for Gorbachev to make such a Decree, because he knows no one
here has the money to make truly independent television."'
' 32
Nevertheless, the financing problem is not insurmountable. Televi-
sion producers wishing to go independent may form co-production ven-
tures with foreign companies. The Soviet partner can provide local
talent while the western partners provide the technical equipment. The
aim would be to produce a television program shown in the Soviet Union
but interesting enough to be exported for profit to the West.
127. Shogren, supra note 97, at F4.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Arguably, this is the legal justification for the military takeover of the local television
station in Lithuania. See infra text accompanying note 201.
132. Shogren, supra note 97, at F4. According to a western scholar of Soviet television,
"[I]t seems unlikely that Gosteleradio's nationwide monopoly of broadcasting will be chal-
lenged." Mass Culture, supra note 1, at 199.
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Alternatively, would-be independent producers can enter into barter
arrangements with western companies. For example, a Soviet television
producer agrees to provide free advertising to a western company in ex-
change for technical equipment or hard currency necessary to purchase
or lease the equipment.
A third solution is to raise capital by either selling shares of televi-
sion programs or obtaining a loan from the newly emerging private coop-
erative banks throughout the Soviet Union. Since state banks do not give
loans to independent television producers, raising capital through private
loans and sale of shares seems a viable alternative.
Independent producers can raise money by charging viewers for ac-
cess to certain television broadcasts. Technology already exists in the
Soviet Union for cable television; in fact, a few cities in the USSR already
have cable television channels.133 This method, however, can only be
moderately successful in raising capital. Cable television will have a
small audience, thereby limiting the amount of income that a cable televi-
sion station can earn. Additionally, the income earned would only be in
non-convertible rubles, preventing cable companies from purchasing
Western-made equipment necessary to operate a cable television station.
Finally, it should be noted that part of the Decree may soon be
superceded by Gorbachev's February 8, 1991 Decree transforming Gos-
teleradio into a wholly-owned public corporation. 4 As discussed below,
the February, 1991 Decree strengthens even further presidential control
of television and radio in the USSR.
1 35
B. August 2, 1990 Law on the Press And Other Mass Media
On August 2, 1990, the Law on the Press and Other Mass Media
came into effect. 36 While the law has become popularly known as the
133. The next major growth in Soviet television will be in cable. Already, cable television
exists in the Soviet Union. See W.J. HOWELL, supra note 1, at 146; FBIS-Sov-90-149, Aug. 2,
1990 at 36 (Gosteleradio Chief Welcomes Cable TV Partnership), 37 (Television, Cable Union
Established); Verdian, Televideniie Po Podpiske (Cable Television), Sovetskaiia Kultura, July
14, 1990 at 2, col. 1. See also infra note 248 (24 hour a day MTV comes to the Soviet Union
via cable television).
134. See Appendix 3 for text of the Feb. 8, 1991 television decree.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 228-34.
136. For the text of the Law on the Press see Appendix 2 [hereinafter "Law on the Press"].
For a critical discussion by a Soviet scholar of the law see Sergeev, Is This A Law?, Sovetskaiia
Kultura, Dec. 22, 1990, at 1. For the text of the Law, see Appendix 2.
After the death of Andrei Sakharov, the Soviet Union's most celebrated human rights
activist and Supreme Soviet Deputy, the Supreme Soviet has become much less independent
and critical of Gorbachev. Whatever law Gorbachev proposes to the Supreme Soviet, the
legislature automatically passes. According to a British scholarly publication, "Where Mr.
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Law on the Press, 137 it regulates not only newspapers and journals but, as
its full title indicates, all other mass media, including television.
It is noteworthy that this is a law passed by the Soviet legislature,
rather than a decree issued by the President. Unlike the television De-
cree, therefore, it signifies the collective will of the elected representatives
of the Soviet population. Moreover, because it is a popularly based law,
the Law on the Press was widely debated prior to its passage.' 38 The
Soviet legislature issued a draft of the Law in 1988.13' For a time it
seemed that the Law would never go into effect; however, with democra-
tization going full speed in the first half of 1989, the Law was brought
before the Supreme Soviet, which quickley passed it. It took effect on
August 2, 1990." ° Finally, because it is a law rather than a decree, the
Law on the Press is more specific than the television Decree issued earlier
by Gorbachev. While the television Decree contemplates enabling legis-
lation in the future, the Law on the Press makes immediate changes to
the regulation of the mass media by the government.
The major thrust of the Law on the Press is to abolish the legal
power of the Soviet censorship office, Glavlit.14I Prior to Gorbachev's
taking power, the Glavlit censors had their own office in every major
newspaper and other mass media organizations in the country. 42 With-
out the censors' "Approved" stamp, no article could be accepted for pub-
lication by the state printing houses nor any speech read over the
Gorbachev leads, the USSR Supreme Soviet blindly follows." The Evil Empire Strikes Back,
Soviet Analyst, Jan. 23, 1991, at 1.
137. See e.g., McNair, supra note 1, at 342; Dobbs, Soviet Censorship: Dead But Showing
Signs of Life: New Title On Door is 'Media Consultant,' Washington Post, Aug. 2, 1990, at
A28, col. 1.
138. For discussions of the draft versions of the Law on the Press see H. SMITH, supra note
1, at 172. McNair, supra note 1, at 342-43; M. Fedotov, Toward Conceptualization Of The
Law On The Press And Information, Sovetskve Gosudarstvo I Pravo (1987).
139. See sources cited supra note 138.
140. According to one western scholar, writing at a time when the passage of the Law on
the Press was still being debated: "Assuming that the draft law is in due course fully imple-
mented (and at the time of writing the process had yet to be completed), it will be the most
significant event in the development of the Soviet media system since Lenin's Press Decree of
1917." McNair, supra note 1, at 343.
The last reference is to the November, 1917 Decree on the Press, one of the first acts of
Soviet power signed by Lenin. The 1917 decree "presupposes the establishment of the total
freedom of the press 'within the limits of responsibility before the courts, according to the
progressive law in this respect.'" Fedotov, supra note 138, at 4 (quoting the 1917 law). The
1917 law was never passed "and disintegrated in numerous normative acts." Id.
141. Glavlit is an acronym in Russian, standing for the "Chief Administration for the Af-
fairs of Literature and Publishing Houses." Glavlit was established in 1922. E. MICKEWICZ,
supra note 1, at 23. See also Mass Culture, supra note 1, at 194.
142. Dobbs, supra note 137, at A28, col. 1.
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electronic mass media. 143 Before 1985, censorship by Glavlit was so
strict that even some of the words of Lenin were banned.' 44 According
to a Soviet political commentator, "I was able to leaf through the Glavlit
book of forbidden subjects on several occasions. Practically everything
was forbidden. Included in the list of what was forbidden was the men-
tioning, directly or even indirectly, the existence of that famous organiza-
tion, Glavlit."'
145
A major impetus for the passage of the Law on the Press was to
bring legal regulations of the mass media up-to-date with reality. For
instance, by the time the Law was passed, the former legal requirement
of prior censorship was widely ignored. Numerous television programs,
for instance, broadcast shows without clearance from the Glavlit
censors. 146
The Law on the Press contains eighty-nine articles. It provides both
new legal freedoms and legal obligations for the Soviet mass media.
Article One sets out the theme of the Law. It begins with the de-
clarative statement: "The press and other mass information media are
free."' 147 It concludes: "Censorship of mass information is not permit-
ted." 1 48 The remainder of Article One defines the terms "freedom of
speech" and "freedom of the press." According to the Article both
terms have the same meaning: "The right to express opinions and be-
liefs, to seek, select, receive, and disseminate information and ideas in
any form, including the press and other mass information media."' 
49
Article Two defines "mass information" and "mass information me-
dia," terms used throughout the Law on the Press. It states that the term
"mass information" specifically includes "the reports or materials pub-
licly disseminated in ... audio visual format,"' 5 ° in other words, televi-
sion. The next paragraph is even more explicit. It states that "mass
information media" means "television and radio programs."15 ' There-
fore, television falls within the jurisdiction of the Law of the Press.
Article Three allows the mass information media to publish and
broadcast in "the languages of the peoples whom they serve or whose
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Law on the Press, art. 1.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Law on the Press, art. 2.
151. Id.
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interest they represent."1 52 For television, this article gives television sta-
tions throughout the Soviet Union the right to broadcast in languages
other than Russian. This article is aimed to protect local television sta-
tions when they wish to broadcast in the native language of their repub-
lic. In the last two decades, as a result of pressure from Gosteleradio, the
percentage of television programs broadcast on local television stations in
Russian has increased.153 This article may reverse the trend.
Article Four states that mass information media, through its edito-
rial office, is a separate legal entity under both USSR and republican
laws.' 54 As a legal entity, the mass information media organ can sue and
be sued. In conformance with Gorbachev's perestroika campaign, the
mass information media organ carries out its activities "in conditions of
economic autonomy and economic accountability."' 55 For television,
this article confirms the need of television stations and television produc-
tion facilities to be economically self-sufficient. As discussed previ-
ously,' 56 economic self-sufficiency today remains the greatest hurdle to
independent television producers starting their own television stations
and creating new television programs.
Article Five, the most widely publicized article of the Law on the
Press, must be read in conjunction with Article One.'57 Article Five sets
out the limits on the mass media's freedom of speech rights. Under Arti-
cle Five the mass information media is not permitted:
(1) [T]o publicize information containing state secrets or other
secrets specifically protected by law;
(2) [T]o call for the violent overthrow or change of the existing
state and social system;
(3) [T]o propagandize war, violence, cruelty, or racial, na-
tional, or religious exclusivity or intolerance;
(4) [T]o disseminate pornography; or
(5) [T]o incite the commission of other criminally punishable
acts. 158
These five prohibitions to the wide-ranging freedom from censorship
set out in Article One pose the most serious threat to freedom of speech
for television and other mass information media organs. The major criti-
152. Law on the Press, art. 3.
153. E. MICKEWICZ, supra note 1, at 17.
154. Law on the Press, art. 4.
155. Id.
156. See supra text accompanying notes 119-23.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 147-49.
158. Law on the Press, art. 5.
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cism leveled against Article Five is that nowhere does it define its terms.
For instance, it is impossible to know what is a "state secret" under the
first prohibition. Therefore, when a television program or other mass
media organ broadcasts or publishes information, it does not know
whether that information constitutes a state secret.
The second prohibition limits political speech. Undoubtedly, it pro-
hibits the mass media from calling for the overthrow of the Communist
system of government. However, this prohibition contains one signifi-
cant caveat: the political speech must call for the violent overthrow of
the existing state and social system. Therefore, peaceful calls for the abo-
lition of Communism are not prohibited by the Law on the Press.
The Law's third category of restrictions at first blush seems reason-
able. Nevertheless, this category can also be criticized for failing to de-
fine its terms. For example, what speech falls under the rubric of
"propagandiz[ing] cruelty . . . or racial, national, or religious . . .
intolerance?"
Experience in the West, especially in the United States, shows the
near impossibility of defining "pornography," the term used in the fourth
prohibition. 59 Finally, the prohibition against inciting the commission
of other criminally punishable acts appears reasonable.
Overall, the failure of the Law on the Press to define the prohibi-
tions on speech subjects it to abuse by governmental authorities. Since
the law proposes criminal punishment for its breach,"6 the Supreme So-
viet should amend the law, or pass subsequent legislation more specifi-
cally defining the terms used in Article Five. It is patently unfair to
impose criminal punishment for conduct that is not specifically defined.
Article Five also prohibits the mass media organs from violating any
Soviet citizen's right of privacy and further prohibits these organs from
defaming any citizen. 6 Later, the Law on the Press devotes two long
and detailed articles on the right of a citizen or organization to rebut a
defamatory publication. Article Twenty-Six gives the defamed person or
organization the "right to request a mass information medium's editorial
office to refute published reports that do not conform with reality or de-
fame the honor and dignity."' 62 For radio and television it specifies that
159. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) ("pornography"); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15 (1973) ("obscenity"). On December 6, 1990, Gorbachev established an anti-
pornography commission "to take urgent measures to protect public morals." Survey, Soviet
Analyst, Jan. 23, 1991 at 8. (quoting text of decree establishing commission).
160. See infra text accompanying notes 186-87.
161. Law on the Press, art. 5.
162. Law on the Press, art. 26.
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the refutation or reply must be "read out by the radio or television an-
nouncer in the same program or series of programs at the same time, not
later than one month following receipt of the demand."' 63 Article
Twenty-Seven empowers the courts to settle disputes between the mass
media organs and the alleged victim of a defamatory publication regard-
ing the victim's rights to refutation and reply.'"
This article illustrates another curious feature of the Law on the
Press. Throughout its text, the Law delegates to Soviet courts the power
to be the final arbiter for any disputes regarding its interpretation.
65
This is in sharp contrast to past practice, and even to the situation today,
where Soviet judges remain nameless, faceless servants with little in-
dependent authority. 166 It is surprising therefore, that the Soviet legisla-
ture would give Soviet courts the power to interpret such an important
law. Moreover, by this feature, the Law on the Press follows the com-
mon law legal tradition where judges have great powers to interpret laws
rather than the civil law legal tradition, where the judges do not have
such powers. 1
67
Undoubtedly, the Law's drafters devoted considerable language to
defamation and its remedies due to the numerous accusations already
being made against the mass media for defaming public personalities. In
the most famous instance, Leningrad Television accused former con-
servative Politburo member Yegor Ligachev of corruption. Ligachev, in
turn, sued Leningrad Television for defamation. 68
Articles Seven to Twenty, listed as Chapter Two of the Law on the
Press, set out the procedures for creating a legally recognizable mass me-
dia organ, referred to as a "mass information medium."' 169 Most impor-
tantly, Article Seven allows any private individual or public or private
organization to create a mass information medium. 170 The State, and
even more important, Communist Party no longer have the exclusive
right to own and control the mass media. Overruling seventy-three years
of Soviet precedent, Article Seven states: "Monopolization of any form
of mass information medium (press, radio, television or others) is not
163. Id
164. Law on the Press, art. 27.
165. See e.g., Law on the Press, arts. 22, 24, 35.
166. See M. GLENDON, M. GORDON AND C. OSAKWE, COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADI-
TIONS 747 (1984).
167. Id.
168. Mass Culture, supra note 1, at 193.
169. Law on the Press, arts. 7-20.
170. Id. at art. 7.
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permitted." 7'
The remainder of the articles in Chapter Two define a "founder" of
a mass information medium and the registration process for creating a
mass medium organ. 72 Soviet courts are given the power to review the
government's denial of a mass media registration application.
17 3
Two major criticisms can be made of the registration process. First,
the law does not specify which government body has the power to regis-
ter a mass media organization. The bitter feud between the central gov-
ernment and the local governments already has resulted in disputes
about which government body can register a television station. Lenin-
grad Television, for instance, has declared its independence from both
Moscow and Leningrad city authorities. Its conservative "founders" are
clashing for control of the airwaves with the radical government of the
Leningrad City Council.' 74
Second, the law does not specify who can be the founder of a mass
information media. As a result, editorial boards of various existing news-
papers have applied for registration as founders. '" Such registration ap-
plications have been challenged by the political bodies which claim to
actually own the newspaper, such as the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union.' 7 6 The Law on the Press must be amended to specify who can
legally be a "founder" of a mass information medium.
Chapter Three of the Law on the Press is short and deals with the
procedure of dissemination of mass information. 177 Its most important
article for television, Article Twenty-Two, prohibits the broadcast of any
television program without obtaining prior authorization from the chief
editor of the broadcast. 178 In effect, "wild rogues" reporters are not per-
mitted to get on the air and broadcast without permission from the man-
agement in charge.
Article Twenty-Four, found in Chapter Four of the Law, sets out
important free speech rights. It states: "Citizens have the right to re-
ceive promptly through the mass information media reliable reports on
the activity of state organs, social organizations and officials. ' 179 This
171. Id.
172. Id. at arts. 8-20.
173. Id at art. 14.
174. FBIS-Sov-91-026 Feb. 7, 1991, at 74 (Leningrad TV Seeks Editorial Independence).
175. FBIS-Sov-91-017, Jan. 25, 1991, at 35. (Leningrad Media To Break From Gostel-
eradio).
176. Id.
177. Law on the Press, arts. 21-23.
178. Id at art. 22.
179. Id at art. 24.
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clause allows the mass media to inform the Soviet public about the activi-
ties of governmental bodies, and their officials. Article Twenty-Four al-
lows a mass media organ to sue a governmental body or a public official
for refusing to provide information about the activity of the governmen-
tal body.'"0 Unfortunately, the Law nowhere sets out what information
must be provided to the mass media. Arguably, the government has no
right to withhold any information from the mass media unless it falls
under the category "state secrets" found in Article Five. It is doubtful
however, whether government bureaucrats will adhere to such an
interpretation.
Articles Twenty-Nine to Thirty-Two, set out as Chapter Five, create
the status of a "journalist." A journalist "means a person engaged in the
gathering, creation, editing or preparation of material for a mass infor-
mation medium and associated with the said medium through labor or
other contractual relations while engaged in such activities with its au-
thorization." '' Television reporters clearly come within the definition
of journalists. The prestigious status of being an individual in the Soviet
Union means that the journalist has, along with other rights, the right
"to seek, obtain and disseminate information;" "to be received by offi-
cials in connection with the exercise of his professional duties as a jour-
nalist;" "to make any recordings, including recordings made using audio-
visual equipment;" and "on presentation of his credentials as a journalist,
to be present at natural disaster areas and at rallies and demonstra-
tions."' 182 These rights, listed in Article Thirty, can rightfully be called
the "Journalist's Bill of Rights" in the Soviet Union.
Each of these rights marks a significant change from previous law
and practice. Journalists now have the right to be investigative reporters,
rather than obedient spokesmen for the government. Moreover, a jour-
nalist now is given a specific right to be present at political rallies and
protests and to freely report on these events. The specific inclusion of the
right of a journalist to be present in natural disaster areas is a reaction to
the former practice of the Soviet rulers censoring news of natural disas-
ters in the country.
18 3
It is unlikely that any amateur "newshound" can now claim the
right as a journalist to be present at rallies, demonstrations and natural
disasters or to be received by government officials. Article Twenty-Nine
specifically requires that the journalist be either an employee of the mass
180. Id
181. Id. at art. 29.
182. Law on the Press, art. 30.
183. See supra text accompanying note 32.
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information medium or an independent contractor for the media organ,
or be working as a journalist with the authorization of the medium.184
As already discussed, a mass information medium itself must be duly
registered with governmental authorities. This disposes of the need of
the actual journalist being registered with the State. The Law's drafters
should be credited for not setting up another bureaucratic step by requir-
ing governmental registration of individual journalists. Moreover, a re-
quirement of individual registration leads to the danger that the State
may refuse registration to the most outspoken critics of the government.
Article Thirty-Three, found in Chapter Six of the Law, deals with
the penetration of foreign mass media in the Soviet Union. Again, in
direct contrast to previous practice, the Law now provides that "USSR
citizens have the right to access to information from foreign sources, in-
cluding direct television broadcasting, radio broadcasting, and press." 185
Jamming of foreign radio programs beamed into the USSR, such as Ra-
dio Liberty, is now prohibited.
Articles Thirty-Five to Thirty-Nine collected as Chapter Seven, set
out the consequences for violating the Law on the Press. Article Thirty-
Seven punishes a mass information medium that engages in compilation
and dissemination of information without registration with a fine of up to
fine hundred rubles and confiscation of the illegal material."8 6 Repeat
offenders are subject to criminal liability and fines of up to one thousand
rubles and confiscation of the technical facilities.
18 7
The Law on the Press likewise imposes liability on government offi-
cials for violating the rights of journalists. Such government officials
open themselves up to criminal liability and a fine of up to five hundred
rubles. 1
88
Finally, Article Thirty-Nine allows the individual to sue a mass in-
formation medium for publishing false or defamatory material. Courts
are given the power for determining the amount of damages a victim of
defamation can receive.1
8 9
IV. SOVIET TELEVISION AND THE HALT OF GLASNOST
The liberalization and privatization of Soviet television that oc-
curred from 1988 to 1990 appears to be a temporary phenomenon. In
184. Law on the Press, art. 29.
185. Id. at art. 33.
186. Id. at art. 37.
187. Id.
188. Id. at art. 36.
189. Law on the Press, art. 39.
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1991, Soviet television is reverting to the pre-Gorbachev era. Increas-
ingly, only views of the central government and the Party are given tele-
vision air time. Critics of the central government in 1991 must struggle
to appear on national television.
Laws passed in 1990 to liberalize television broadcasting and expand
the freedom of the mass media are still on the books. However,
Gorbachev and his supporters, in a bid to hold on to power, are paying
little attention to legal rules which they themselves promulgated.
A. Soviet Television Returns to Its Past
As the Soviet Union enters a new decade, its economic system is
crumbling. Productivity and economic output are both going down."9
Perestroika, at least to date, has not improved the Soviet economy, but in
many respects has made it even worse. 191 At the same time, the various
republics of the Soviet Union are calling for not only economic but also
political independence. 192 In 1990, the Soviet parliament gave
Gorbachev the power to rule by presidential decree. Gorbachev was in-
structed to use this power to stabilize the nation's political and economic
situation.193 Unfortunately, Gorbachev is increasingly using this new
power to stifle dissent.194 One of the first victims of Gorbachev's new
policy has been television.
Examining from hindsight, the critical event leading directly to op-
pression of Soviet television was the surprise resignation on December
20, 1990 of Edvard Shevardnadze as Foreign Minister of the USSR.19
In his resignation announcement, Shevardnadze warned in vague terms,
of the emerging dictatorship in the Soviet Union.'96
Eight days later, on December 28, 1990, Vzglyad, the radical late-
night Pervaya Programa program,19 intended to interview two of
Shevardnadze's aides who would explain why the Foreign Minister re-
signed. The show was never aired. Leonid Kravchenko, Gorbachev's
newly appointed chairman of Gosteleradio, personally banned the De-
cember 28th broadcast.' 98 Kravchenko, however, did not stop at ban-
ning one controversial broadcast. The January 4, 1991 edition of
190. See Goldberg, Perestroika's Broken Promises, A.B.A.J., Mar. 1991, at 28.
191. Id
192. Id
193. Nelan, Boris v. Mikhall, TIME, Mar. 24, 1991, at 26, 30.
194. See Coleman, Time To End A Fixation On Gorbachev?, TIME, Mar. 18, 1991, at 47.
195. Talbot, The Conductor of Discord, TIME, Mar. 25, 1991, at 33.
196. Id.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93.
198. Survey, Soviet Analyst, Feb. 6, 1991, at 7.
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Vzglyad also was cancelled. 9 9 On January 10, 1991, Gosteleradio an-
nounced that the program was being suspended indefinitely.2°°
On January 13, 1991, the next momentous event occurred. Soviet
paratroopers stormed and took over the television broadcasting center in
the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius. Fourteen people were killed in the pro-
cess.2°" The purpose of the takeover was to silence the increasingly criti-
cal coverage of Gorbachev by the pro-independence Lithuanian
television.
On January 16, 1991, Gorbachev dropped another bombshell. With
the liberal mass media severely criticizing the military takeover of the
television center in Vilnius, Gorbachev proposed that the Supreme Soviet
suspend for six months the Law on the Press.2"2 Gorbachev stated:
I propose that we now suspend the law on the press. The
Supreme Soviet has the full power to take this step. Construc-
tive dialogue and cooperation is very important for us now. I
think that our newspapers and television and radio stations
should express the viewpoint of society and not that of some
political groups, especially narrow groups.20 3
Gorbachev's effort to suspend the Law on the Press did not succeed.
Instead, the Supreme Soviet passed an alternative measure creating a leg-
islative committee to work on procedures for insuring greater objectivity
by the mass media. °' On the same day that Gorbachev sought to sus-
pend the Law on the Press, Pervaya Programa aired, immediately follow-
ing Vremya, a ten minute documentary praising the paratroopers who
seized the television station and accusing Lithuanian nationalists of fo-
menting violence in the republic.20' Surprisingly, Alexander Nevzorov,
the host and producer of the liberal Leningrad news show, 600
Seconds,2'a hosted the program.
199. Id.
200. Id.; Soviets Take Radical TV Show Off The Air, L.A. Times, Jan. 11, 1991, at A4, col.
1. A few weeks later, Vzglyad began broadcasting intermittently on Leningrad Television.
Shogren, Soviets Curb Alternative Radio Station, L.A. Times, Feb. 4, 1991, at A4, col. 1; Parks,
Liberal Soviet Daily Gets Pressure From The Right, L.A. Times Feb. 5, 1991, at H2, col. 4.
201. According to a western news report, "In Lithuania, the republic's television broadcast
center is still in the hands of the anonymous [pro-Communist] 'Committee of National Salva-
tion' after its seizure by the army." Parks, supra note 200, at H2, col. 4.
202. Parks, Gorbachev Defeated in Bid to Suspend Press Law, L.A. Times, Jan. 17, 1991, at
A36, col. 1. See also Eaton & Kempster, Administration Condemns Gorbachev's Call For Leg-
islature to Suspend Press Law, L.A. Times, Jan. 17, 1991, at 36, col. 1.
203. See Parks, supra note 202.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Two weeks later, Nevzorov survived a 2 a.m. assassination attempt while he was riding
in a car outside of Riga, the capital of the Baltic Republic of Latvia. Soviet Glasnost Journalist
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Following the successful takeover of the Lithuanian television sta-
tion, Gosteleradio forbid the liberal Television News Service (TNS) to
critically cover the events in the Baltics.2 °7 Instead, TNS was given a
script as to what news they could report. When TNS officials refused to
read the official news report, a government spokesman was forced to read
the "official version" of the news.208
Gorbachev's tightening control of the mass media coincided with his
call on February 6, 1991 for a March 17, 1991 referendum on the future
status of the Soviet Union.2°9 Following the announcement of the up-
coming referendum, Gorbachev immediately took to the television air-
waves urging passage of the referendum.21 ° Soviet television began a
massive campaign to convince viewers to support Gorbachev's position.
In late February, 1991, when Gorbachev flew to Minsk to further pro-
mote the referendum, Soviet television widely covered his trip.211 In a
style reminiscent of the Brezhnev era, Gorbachev's entire speeches were
televised. 212 Numerous television programs promoted only one political
position: the March 17, 1991 referendum must be approved.
Despite increasing conservatism, Soviet television sometimes still
presents an alternative political point of view. On February 19, 1991,
Boris Yeltsin, President of the Russian Republic and Gorbachev's ar-
chrival, was allowed to appear on a live, late night television program.213
Yeltsin had previously complained that he had been denied access to tele-
vision, and specifically accused Kravchenko of being behind the move.214
Moreover, two weeks earlier, Gosteleradio withdrew key frequencies of
Radio Rossya, the pro-Yeltsin Russian Republic radio station which had
Survives Ambush With Guns and Grenade, L.A. Times, Feb. 4, 1991, at A4, col. 4. According
to one report, "Nevzorov, once the darling and epitome of glasnost for his aggressive crime
reporting [on 600 Seconds] has been discredited in the eyes of liberals because of his stand on
the Vilnius massacre." Id. For discussion of Nevzorov and his show 600 Seconds see H.
SMITH, supra note 1, at 153-54.
207. Shogren, supra note 200, at A4, cols. 1-2.
208. Id.
209. Nelan, Boris v. Mikhail, TIME, Mar. 24, 1991, at 26, 30.
210. Dahlburg, Gorbachev Asks Unity, Calls Critics Neo-Bolsheviks in Byelorussia Trip, L.A.
Times, Feb. 27, 1991, at A3, col. 1; Clines, Top Story on Moscow TV Vote 'Da' on Referen-
dum, L.A. Times, Mar. 8, 1991, at A3, col. 3; Dahlburg, Gorbachev, Yeltsin Clash in Rival
Broadcasts on National Unity Vote, L.A. Times, March 16, 1991, at A13, col. 1.
211. Dahlburg, L.A. Times, Feb. 27, 1991, supra note 210, at A3, col. 4.
212. Id.
213. Dahlburg, Gorbachev Must Go, Yeltsin Says, L.A. Times, Feb. 20, 1991, at AI, col. 4.
214. Dahlburg, supra note 213, at A1, A2 1, col. 1. Prior to his appearance, Yeltsin insisted
on a one-hour live, television address on Pervaya Programa. Kravchenko made the following
counter-offer: thirty minutes, on Ftaraya Programa, and prerecorded. Yeltsin refused, (see
FBIS-Sov-91-026, Feb. 7, 1991 at 70) and eventually prevailed.
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been operating since December, 1990.2"5 It was unexpected, therefore,
that Yeltsin would appear live on state-controlled television. Given an
opportunity to address a nation-wide audience, Yeltsin issued an unprec-
edented call for Gorbachev's immediate resignation.216
The next day, Gorbachev and Kravchenko mounted a television
counter-attack. Breaking with the recent practice of showing only
delayed broadcasts of Supreme Soviet sessions, national television began
broadcasting live, midday coverage of repeated condemnations of Yeltsin
by Supreme Soviet deputies.2"7
Vremya that evening devoted the first seventeen minutes of its
broadcast to anti-Yeltsin features. The television program showed the
President of the Ukrainian Republic criticizing Yeltsin's speech as being
"hasty, ill-considered and irresponsible" and cautioning that it "might be
used for the further destablization of the country."21 The program also
featured a congress of the heads of Soviet industries issuing a statement
criticizing Yeltsin.21 9
Three days later, on February 23, 1991, a rally was held in Moscow
in support of the Gorbachev government.22 Military reservists were
given special time off to attend the rally.221 Soviet television extensively
covered the demonstration, and continued to interview individuals who
specifically criticized Yeltsin and called for his resignation from the Rus-
sian parliament.222
The next day a pro-Yeltsin rally was held in Moscow. According to
the Western media, between forty thousand 22 3 to one hundred thou-
sand 224 people took to the streets to voice their support for Yeltsin, and
215. Parks, Conservatives Step Up Attacks on Gorbachev, L.A. Times, Feb. 3, 1991, at Al,
A25, col. 6; Shogren, supra note 200, at A4, col. 1; Magurn, The Rise And Fall Of Radio
Russia, Soviet Analyst, Feb. 20, 1991, at 5.
216. Yeltsin stated on the live program: "I am disassociating myself from the presidential
position and policy and calling for [Gorbachev's] immediate resignation and the delegation of
[his] powers to a collective body, namely the Council of the Federation [the executive body
composed of the heads of the 15 republics]. Dahlburg, supra note 213, at A 1, col. 4. Vremya,
the nationwide evening television program, completely ignored Yeltsin's announcement. Id
217. Shogren, Yeltsin Reprimanded For Calling Gorbachev To Quit, L.A. Times, Feb. 21,
1991, at A21, col. 1; Fein, Soviets Counterattack, Assailing Yeltsin Demand, N.Y. Times, Feb.
17, 1991, at A8, col. 4.
218. Fein, supra note 217, at A21.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Clines, 40,000 Rally To Support Yeltsin Against Gorbachev, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1991,
at A3, col. 3.
224. 100,000 Back Up Yeltsin In Rally Near Kremlin, L.A. Times, Feb. 25, 1991, at A4, col.
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demand the resignation of Gorbachev.2 2 Interestingly, some of the
harshest criticism at the rally was levelled at Kravchenko for slanting
coverage in favor of Gorbachev.226 According to one speaker, "Yester-
day [Kravchenko] showed us the rally of soldiers, of KGB and of ap-
paratchiks, who were brought here by force. Today we demonstrate the
free will of the people. Let him prove that he is not a boot-licker. The
next word is yours, Mr. Kravchenko." '227 Kravchenko never responded.
B. The February, 1991 Decree
Unable to convince the Supreme Soviet to suspend the Law on the
Press, Gorbachev took an alternate legal route aimed to curb criticism of
his government on Soviet television. On February 8, 1991, Gorbachev
issued a presidential decree transforming Gosteleradio from a govern-
mental committee into an autonomous, state-owned corporation, called
the "All Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company.
228
Gorbachev named Leonid Kravchenko, the chairman of Gosteleradio, as
head of the new public corporation. 229 This new organizational structure
gives the company chairman greater powers than those given the old
Gosteleradio chairman. The company chairman is allowed to make
225. For further discussion of the rivalry between Yeltsin and Gorbachev see Nelan, supra
note 209, at 26.
226. Never before has a head of Gosteleradio come under such special scrutiny.
227. L.A. Times, supra note 224, at A4, col. 1. (statement of Telman Gdlyan, a former
high-ranking Soviet investigator fired by Gorbachev). Despite its large size, Vremya showed
no footage of the pro-Yeltsin rally. Instead, a newscaster read a short account of the rally
issued by Tass, the official Soviet news agency. Id
A special report then followed the Vremya program, showing film of the previous day's
anti-Yeltsin rally. According to a New York Times report, the television special report exag-
gerated the size of the crowd at the anti-Yeltsin rally by ten-fold and distorted other facts.
Clines, supra note 223, at A3, col. 4.
On March 10, 1991, another pro-Yeltsin rally was held in Moscow, with more than
100,000 people marching through the capital demanding Gorbachev's resignation. The
Vremya reporter covered the rally as follows: "I honestly wanted to find something construc-
tive to report, but all I heard was no, no to the president, no to the Supreme Soviet, no to the
referendum. All right, destroy everything, but will that make our lives better?" Schmemann,
Huge Rally In Moscow Calls On Gorbachev To Resign, N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1991, at A3, col.
3.
228. For the text of the decree, see Appendix 3. See also Parks, Changes Seem To Ensure
Gorbachev's Grip On TV Radio, L.A. Times, Feb. 9, 1991, at A20, col. 1; Magurn, supra note
215, at 6.
229. Parks, supra note 215, at A20, col. 1. A British observer of Soviet television face-
tiously comments on Kravchenko's appointment: "The most ominous announcement by
Kravchenko was that at that moment he was the sole employee of the new company; all other
staff of Gosteleradio would have to arrange contracts with the new company. Naturally, no
honest and conscientious employee had anything to worry about. Of course not!" Magurn,
The Rise And Fall Of Radio Russia, Soviet Analyst, Feb. 20, 1991, at 6.
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many more decisions without consulting with government and Party offi-
cials; the chairman is also freed from supervision by the Communist
Party, as well as by the Supreme Soviet.230 Under the new scheme, the
chairman of the company is responsible only to the President of the
USSR, namely Gorbachev.23'
The February, 1991 decree also allows the company to retain its
foreign currency earnings. 232 Previously, Gosteleradio had to turn over
its revenues to the State. Moreover, "because it is no longer effectively a
government ministry but a public corporation, the new body will be freed
from state regulations and wages, and Soviet journalists expect
Kravchenko to grant substantial raises in an effort to reduce tensions.
233
At the same time Gorbachev created a new radio and television
council, whose task would be to coordinate national broadcasting and
assist the various Soviet republics to develop their own programming and
facilities. Kravchenko was appointed chairman of the council.
2 34
The transformation of the forty-year old television and radio com-
mittee into a public corporation provides Gorbachev with greater powers
to control television. The new corporation is directly responsible to
Kravchenko and Gorbachev. Kravchenko, unlike his most recent prede-
cessors, has proven to be a Gorbachev loyalist who is not afraid to take
repressive measures against the mass media. In effect, the reorganization
decree gives Gorbachev, in his role as President of the USSR, virtual
control over the television airwaves.
By early 1991, therefore, Soviet television has made a sharp turn-
about in its coverage of political events. With the exception of Yeltsin's
February, 1991 appearance, Soviet television presents only the viewpoint
of Gorbachev and his supporters. Gorbachev's new allegiance with the
conservatives has resulted in the near-total disappearance of democracy
on Soviet television. "Critical television" now means criticism of
Gorbachev's opponents. Given the power to rule by decree, Gorbachev
has increasingly used that power to stifle opposition and to keep his op-
ponents away from the mass media.
V. THE FUTURE OF SOVIET TELEVISION AND THE LAW
Before the Gorbachev era, making predictions for the Soviet Union
230. Parks, supra note 215, at A20, col. 2.
231. Id.
232. Id. at col. 4-5.
233. Id. at col. 4.
234. Id.
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was a relatively easy task.2 35 Gorbachev's predecessors followed cau-
tious and conservative policies. Changes in the Soviet Union came about
slowly and gradually. The situation has now completely changed. Every
day brings new economic changes, political events, and laws.236 It be-
comes more difficult, therefore, to predict what Soviet television and the
legal rules covering its administration will look like in the future.
A general prediction can be made. Soviet television and its legal
rules will always reflect the political situation in the country. Where the
Soviet nation goes, Soviet television will not merely follow, but will lead
the way. From this general prediction, more specific comments can be
made.
The worst case scenario involves the break up of the Soviet Union,
and even civil war.237 In such instance, Soviet television will become
part of the fray. Each political movement will seek to seize the television
airways to pronounce and promote its point of view. Every political
movement in the world today recognizes the power of television to influ-
ence public opinion. In a political uprising, the rebels first seek to cap-
ture the nation's television facilities. Most often, the political group that
is able to control the television airways will be the group that will ulti-
mately succeed in gaining political power during a civil war. If a civil
war occurs in the Soviet Union, the conservative and radical political
movements will fight over control of the television airwaves.238
With civil war, laws on the books governing Soviet television will
become quickly obsolete. It becomes irrelevant therefore to discuss the
legal status of Soviet television during a civil war.
In a second scenario of the future of the Soviet Union, civil war is
avoided, but only at the cost of returning the country to its previous
totalitarian status. Attempting to hold onto power, Gorbachev may
move even further to the right and align himself with the powerful, but
conservative institutions which can help keep him in power: the KGB
235. Western Sovietologists used to predict the Soviet political future by examining the
order in which Communist Party leaders lined up to watch the annual May Day Parade on
Red Square. Those standing closest to the General Secretary of the Party were considered
"rising stars" in the Party.
236. Nelan, supra note 193, at 26-27.
237. See Church, Operation Steppe Shield?, TIME, Mar. 18, 1991, at 59 ("There is nothing
farfetched about the idea that there might be a civil war in the USSR.").
238. In a January, 1991 speech Ivan Polozkov, head of the conservative Russian Republic
Communist Party, complained that "the country's news media ... were almost totally in the
hands of liberals. 'If the monopoly on glasnost belonged before to the Communist Party...
now it is in the hands of forces that are fighting against the Party.'" Parks, supra note 215, at
A25, col. 4. The Party conservatives very much would like to wrest any control over the mass
media from the "liberals."
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and the military. Alternatively, the military may stage a coup d'etat for
the first time in Soviet history, and impose military rule upon the nation.
In such instance, the military may even allow Gorbachev to stay on as
President of the USSR. Gorbachev may then become the ceremonial
head of the Soviet state, with no more political power than the British
monarch.
To predict how Soviet television and the law will look in such a
political setting, one needs merely to look at the state of Soviet television
prior to the Gorbachev era. A central government agency will control
the television facilities throughout the USSR. Program content will be
directed from Moscow. Alternative political viewpoints will not be toler-
ated. Live political programs and debate will no longer be aired. Soviet
television, along with the rest of the mass media, will return to its dreary
past.
In such instance, Gorbachev, or his more conservative successor,
may even retain the Law on the Press, the 1990 television Decree and
other regulations permitting free speech and privatization. The law on
the books, however, will have little resemblance to reality. Soviet history
demonstrates that the Communist rulers have a penchant for issuing glo-
rious legal pronouncements and then ignoring them completely.239 The
1936 Soviet Constitution was issued by Stalin during the height of his
repression. Yet, Stalin's Constitution provided on paper the rights and
liberties not yet available in the West. 2' Similarly, the 1977 Brezhnev
Constitution,24 still in force today, provides for freedom of speech,242
freedom of the press,243 freedom of religion, 2" and the right of the vari-
ous republics to secede from the Soviet Union.245 Most of these rights
and guarantees have never actually come into existence. 2 6
Unfortunately, the grave political and economic difficulties the So-
239. See H. SMITH, supra note 1, at 173. See generally O.S. IOFFE, SOVIET LAW AND
SOVIET REALrrY (1985) (critical treatise of differences between Soviet law on the books and
Soviet law in reality, by one of the Soviet Union's foremost legal scholars, now living in the
West).
240. See B. PAULU, supra note 1, at 41-42.
241. See KONST. SSSR (USSR Constitution), adopted at the Seventh (Special) session of the
Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Ninth Convocation, Oct. 7, 1977.
242. Id at art. 50. Article 50 also states: "Exercise of these political freedoms is ensured by
... the opportunity to use the press, television, and radio." See also W.J. HOWELL, supra note
1, at 134 (discussion of the Soviet Constitution and the mass media).
243. KONST. SSSR (USSR Constitution).
244. Id at art. 52.
245. Id. at art. 72.
246. Professor Leon Lipson of Yale Law School tells the following anecdote: A Soviet
dissident is arrested by the KGB for protesting in Red Square. During his interrogation, the
dissident points to the article of the Soviet Constitution giving him the right to protest. To
1991]
LOYOLA ENTERTAINMENT LAW JOURNAL
viet Union is presently encountering makes this return to the past a more
likely possibility. As discussed above,247 in 1991 television has been re-
turning to its previous role as merely a "mouthpiece" of the Communist
rulers in power. On the entertainment side, Soviet television may con-
tinue to allow Western-type television programs. The conservative rulers
may wish to promote more entertainment shows in order to keep the
Soviet populace complacent. Leonid Kravchencko recently commented
that "the people had gotten fed up with political clap-trap and wanted
real feelings."24 This is reminiscent of George Orwell's work in 1984,
where the rulers disseminate innocuous public culture to their people.249
The third, and most hopeful scenario, is that the reforms begun by
Mikhail Gorbachev will be continued by him, or by a liberal successor.
While the economic program ofperestroika may currently be regarded as
a failure, the success of glasnost should not be underestimated. 2 "° For
the first time in Soviet history, the Soviet public is allowed to publicly
criticize its rulers.251 Prior to Gorbachev, it was unimaginable that tele-
vision would air programs challenging Soviet power.252
When democratic reforms are instituted, it becomes more difficult to
turn back the clock and return to the old system. Assuming, therefore,
that liberalization in the Soviet Union once again can continue, a place
exists for the law to help Soviet television retain its newfound freedoms.
Four reforms can help keep Soviet television democratic.
this, the KGB interrogator responds, "Comrade, I thought we were having a serious
discussion."
247. See supra text accompanying notes 228-34.
According to Vladislav Fronin, the editor-in-chief of the now-liberal newspaper Kom-
somolskaya Pravda, "If Gorbachev could find a way, he might well reimpose government
controls on all the media .... There is no mistaking the shift to the right now ... and freedom
of the press and freedom of speech could easily be judged as 'somewhat premature' for our
situation." Parks, supra note 200, at H2, col. 5.
248. FBIS-Sov-91-036, Feb. 22, 1991, at 68. And entertainment is what they are getting.
See L.A. Times, Feb. 5, 1991 at F9, col. 3 ("Geraldo Rivera's television talk show will be
dubbed in Russian and aired daily in the Soviet Union starting March 1"); Shogren, Leningrad
Tunes In To Its MTV Today, L.A. Times, Mar. 8, 1991, at F24, col. 4 (140,000 homes in
Leningrad receiving cable television can now tune in to MTV in Europe 24 hours a day; no
censorship is predicted for the MTV videos); Carney, Murder and Mayhem, TIME, Feb. 11,
1991 ("Soviet television and newspapers have turned graphic tales of violence into standard
fare").
249. See e.g., FBIS-Sov-91-036, Feb. 22, 1991, at 67 (Central TV Moving Toward 'Orwel-
lian' Model).
250. See Bazyler, supra note 5, at 1501-03 (discussing the success ofglasnost and the failure
of perestroika).
251. Id. at 1501.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 55-61.
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A. Strengthening Free Speech Guarantees
Of foremost importance to Soviet television are the laws dealing
with freedom of speech and freedom of the press. If the Supreme Soviet
promulgates more laws giving ordinary citizens the right to criticize the
State, then Soviet television will benefit. New laws protecting the rights
of individuals and the mass media to speak freely cannot alone guarantee
that this will actually occur.253 Nevertheless, without a legal foundation
which television commentators can point to as a basis for engaging con-
troversial news gathering and reporting, it is doubtful that politically in-
dependent television will ever flourish in the Soviet Union. The 1990
Law on the Press is a significant step in institutionalizing the new free-
doms granted through glasnost, but as discussed above,254 the Law needs
further amendments to clarify the distinction between permissive speech
and forbidden speech.
Western legal systems show that complete freedom of speech is im-
possible.255 Prohibitions against speech calling for political violence or
racial and religious hatred appear as reasonable restraints to freedom of
speech.256 Other laws, such as criminal sanctions for insulting the Soviet
presidency or defaming the Soviet flag,257 are throwbacks to the pre-
Gorbachev era and should be abolished. As in the West, courts in the
Soviet Union will need to play an increased role in defining the limits of
allowed speech in the country.
The need for a free and robust mass media in the Soviet Union must,
however, be balanced against the need to protect individuals from defa-
mation and undue intrusion into their lives. Already, Soviet television
has been accused of unfair investigative journalism.258 As in the West,
the Soviet legal system will need to further refine the civil law of defama-
tion and the right to privacy in the Soviet Union. The Law on the Press
has already confronted the problem by specifically devoting a number of
articles to the issue of defamatory communication.2 59 The law may help
assure that a robust and free-wheeling Soviet mass media is also a respon-
sible mass media.
253. See e.g. supra text accompanying notes 237-43.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 159-60.
255. See L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 785-1062 (2d ed. 1988).
256. Id
257. See e.g., Woman Acquitted of Gorbachev Insult, L.A. Times, Mar. 2, 1991, at A24, col.
1 (Soviet dissident acquitted of "insulting the President" but found guilty of "insulting the
State flag" because she burned two red Soviet hammer-and-sickle flags in a public protest. She
was sentenced to two years of correctional labor.).
258. See supra text accompanying notes 161-68.
259. Id.
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B. Greater Privatization of the Television Industry
Undoubtedly, State-owned television will dominate the airwaves.
Further privatization of the Soviet television industry will promote de-
mocracy in the USSR. Independent television channels can present
points of view not available on State television channels. Private televi-
sion channels, therefore, should be allowed to flourish. The Supreme So-
viet should take the general statements of Gorbachev's 1990 television
Decree and transform them into concrete guidelines for allowing the cre-
ation and operation of private television in the USSR.
Moreover, State-owned television should not necessarily mean tele-
vision providing only the government point of view. The British Broad-
casting Company in Great Britain,2" the Canadian Broadcasting
Company in Canada,261 and the Public Broadcasting Service in the
United States,262 are good examples of public-owned television channels
which allow criticism of, and dissent from, the official government posi-
tion. The employees who work for a government-owned television chan-
nel need not necessarily be "mouthpieces" of the government.
New technology being developed in the West, such as cable televi-
sion, fiber optics, transmission of television signals over telephone wires,
and interactive television, will most likely be introduced to Soviet televi-
sion viewers by private industry. In the last decade, new technology has
spawned greater privatization of television throughout the world.263 Un-
less the Soviet Union once again becomes a closed society, the trend to-
ward privatization of television will continue in the USSR.
C. Greater Foreign Influence over Soviet Television
If democracy continues in the Soviet Union, it is inevitable that
Western television will play a greater role in Soviet society. Already,
Soviet television shows are emulating television in the West. Western
television, however, will play a greater role than merely a model figure
for Soviet television producers and journalists. Throughout the world,
foreign television shows are freely broadcasting on local television sys-
tems. As elsewhere in the world, American shows may eventually domi-
nate Soviet television.
260. See S.W. HEAD, supra note 1, at 70-71, 91-92.
261. For a recent discussion of the Canadian Broadcasting Service ("CBC") see Walsh,
Keeping Canada Canadian is Goal of Public TV Network, L.A. Times, Feb. 26, 1991, at H4,
col. 1. See also S.W. HEAD, supra note 1, at 87-88.
262. S.W. HEAD, supra note 1, at 205, 284, 313.
263. See S.W. HEAD, supra note 1, at 144-50. W. MCCAVITr, TELEVISION TECHNOLOGY:
ALTERNATIVE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS ix, 47-62, 119-23, 133-34 (1983).
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The Soviet television and film industry is in great need of Western
technology to produce programs for the domestic market.2 '" Soviet-
American television co-productions, therefore, may become more
common.
It is less likely that a Soviet television station will be jointly or par-
tially owned by foreign interests. Most nations, including the United
States, prohibit foreigners from owning the public airwaves.26 The So-
viet Union, undoubtedly will also prohibit foreign television ownership.
D. Greater Decentralization of Soviet Television
It is now unanimously agreed, both in the Soviet Union and in the
West, that if the USSR, or whatever it may wish to call itself in the fu-
ture, is to survive, the various republics must be given more control over
their own affairs. Political decentralization inevitably will lead to decen-
tralization of the Soviet television industry. Gorbachev's attempts to
keep a strong central television system, whether in form of a state com-
mittee or an independent government-owned corporation, cannot suc-
ceed in the long run. Pervaya Programa may continue to broadcast from
the central television studios in Moscow; the various republics, however,
must be given the legal right to have their own independent television
stations. A successful confederation of sovereign states will lead to a
confederation of independent television stations throughout the territory
of what is now the USSR.
VI. CONCLUSION
Soviet television has undergone a rapid transformation in the last six
years. A pioneer of democracy in Gorbachev's Soviet Union, it is now
reverting to its former role as a tool of Government propaganda. Never-
theless, free-wheeling journalism and political debates still may appear
on Soviet television. Legal reforms have lagged behind actual changes in
the Soviet, television industry. Nevertheless, new laws have helped to
promote independent television in the Soviet Union. The success of these
264. A typical Soviet-American television project is the joint venture Lencentel, organized
by the Leningrad City Council and Rutter-Dunn Communications, Inc. of Columbus, Ohio.
Lencentel contracted with MTV Europe to broadcast MTV 24 hours a day on Leningrad
Cable Television. Cable subscribers will pay for the service with rubles. Lencentel will pay its
fees to MTV with hard currency. Since the MTV project will not generate hard currency,
Lencentel will earn hard currency to pay MTV through other projects, including selling adver-
tising to foreign companies in other media, such as billboards, and the manufacture of cable
television equipment for export to the West. Shogren, supra note 248, at F24, col. 4.
265. See e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1934) (forbidding non-U.S. citizens from owning majority
interest in a radio or television station in the United States).
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laws is best illustrated by the opposition to them voiced by the conserva-
tive elements of Soviet society. Gorbachev's move to suspend the Law
on the Press underscores the significance of that law. If the Law on the
Press is useless, Gorbachev would not have strongly pushed for its sus-
pension, and liberal lawmakers likewise would not have passionately
fought for its existence. Soviet television can promote democracy in the
Soviet Union. Soviet law can assist Soviet television in such an effort.
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APPENDIX 1
USSR PRESIDENT'S DECREE ON DEMOCRATIZATION AND
DEVELOPMENT OF TELEVISION AND RADIO
BROADCASTING IN THE USSR
Television and radio are the largest mediums of the media for infor-
mation, propaganda, and education. The content and trend of their pro-
grams, in the presence of objectivity and balanced assessment, to a large
extent form public opinion and people's feelings. At the present time,
when we are embarking on profound and complex transformations it is
particularly important that television and radio should fully promote the
consolidation of society; strengthen its stability and tranquility; and se-
cure the protection of state interests, the humanization of relations
among people, law and order, and inter-ethnic concord. Such aims de-
mand the retention and the development of television and radio as a
structure common to the whole nation.
At the same time the democratization of society, the growth in the
role of sovereign Union republics and of the soviets of people's deputies,
and the real emergence of political pluralism require a cardinal change in
the nature of the country's television and radio broadcasting. I consider
the following essential;
First: to define the legal basis of the activity of television and radio
broadcasting in the new conditions; for this purpose, to recommend that
the USSR Supreme Soviet adopt a law on the USSR regulating the activ-
ity of television and radio broadcasting in the country, and determining
the status and competence of the USSR State Committee for Television
and Radio Broadcasting and its mutual relations with central, republi-
can, and local organs of power, political, and public organizations.
Second: To adopt a course toward expanding the rights and powers
of republican, kray, and oblast television and radio committees; to make
provisions in their structure for subdivisions which work on the provi-
sion of information to local organs of power; for the USSR Council of
Ministers to coordinate with the councils of ministers of the Union re-
publics and the Moscow and Leningrad Soviets on a procedure for allo-
cating air time, channels, and frequencies for these purposes and for
resolving matters relating to cadres; to take as a premise that soviets of
people's deputies at all levels, public organizations, and parties have the
right to open new television and radio centers or studios from their own
financial and technical resources, or by means of leasing air time and the
technical means of broadcasting from the USSR State Committee for
Television and Radio Broadcasting and the USSR Ministry of Communi-
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cations; in accordance with international practice, the creation and activ-
ity of such centers and studios should be registered by license; for the
USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting to con-
firm jointly with the USSR Ministry of Justice, prior to 1 September 1990
temporary provisions on the procedure for issuing licenses, bearing in
mind that these acts will in fact be defined in a law of the USSR in the
future; taking account of the importance of retaining a system of televi-
sion and radio common to the whole nation, to deem as invalid any acts
on the part of republican, kray, and oblast organs adopted without agree-
ment with the USSR Council of Ministers, and directed at changing the
legal and property position of the functioning subdivisions of the USSR
State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting.
Third: To establish that the functions of state television and radio
broadcasting should be implemented independently of political and pub-
lic organizations, and serve the objective and all-round coverage of the
processes taking place in the country.
The monopolization of air time by one or another party, political
current, or group, is impermissible, as is the conversion of state television
and radio broadcasting into a means of disseminating the private political
views of its staff.
Fourth: To make it incumbent on the USSR State Committee for
Television and Radio Broadcasting to carry out a reorganization of its
activity for the fuller and freer manifestation of the creative potential of
its employees and the strengthening of democratic principles. To switch
to a competitive contract system of work agreements, to raise the mate-
rial incentive of work by employees, and opportunities of self-financing
for individual sections. To grant the USSR State Committee for Televi-
sion and Radio Broadcasting the right to independently decide questions
of staff structures and official rates of pay, taking into account the state of
its finances, and to regularly use for these purposes part of the profit from
commercial activity.
Fifth: The USSR Council of Ministers, jointly with the Councils of
Ministers of Union Republics, should, by October 1990, examine the
comprehensive program of material-technical and financial backing sub-
mitted by the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broad-
casting, taking into account the necessity for the construction of a
Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Television and radio equip-
ment and studio complex in Moscow City. Under the state program for
the conversion of industrial defense sectors, there should be examination
of the proposal for using the new space system Gelikon and Energia, and
also mobile space communications reception and transmission systems
[Vol. I11
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designated for providing the country's population with multi-channel tel-
evision and radio.
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APPENDIX 2
USSR LAW ON THE PRESS AND OTHER MASS INFORMATION MEDIA
Chapter. I. General Provisions
Article 1. Freedom of the press
The press and other mass information media are free.
Freedom of speech and freedom of the press, which are guaranteed
to citizens by the USSR Constitution, mean the right to express opinions
and beliefs, to seek, select, receive, and disseminate information and ideas
in any form, including the press and other mass information media.
Censorship of mass information is not permitted.
Article 2. The mass information media
In the present law, mass information means reports and materials
publicly disseminated in printed, audio, and audiovisual format.
Mass information media means newspapers, journals, television and
radio programs, documentary movies, and other periodical forms of pub-
licly disseminated mass information.
Mass information media are represented by the editorials offices of
the periodical press and of television and radio broadcasting (news agen-
cies and other institutions engaged in the production of mass
information).
Article 3. The language of the mass information media
The mass information media engage in their activity in the lan-
guages of the peoples whom they serve or whose interests they represent.
The mass information media have the right to disseminate mass informa-
tion in other languages.
The state guarantees the right of USSR citizens to use their native
language and other languages of USSR peoples when receiving and dis-
seminating mass information in conformity with legislation on the lan-
guages of USSR peoples.
Article 4. Production and economic activity
The editorial office of mass information media is a legal entity oper-
ating on the basis of its statutes.
The editorial office has the right to carry out production and eco-
nomic activity in conditions of economic autonomy and economic
accountability.
The procedure for the granting of state subsidies to mass informa-
tion media is defined by legislation of the USSR and Union and autono-
mous republics.
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Article 5. Impermissibility of abuse of the freedom of speech
The use of mass information media to publicize information con-
taining state secrets or other secrets specifically protected by law, to call
for the violent overthrow or change of the existing state and social sys-
tem, to propagandize war, violence, cruelty, or racial, national, or reli-
gious exclusivity or intolerance, to disseminate pornography, or to incite
the commission of other criminally punishable acts is not permitted.
The use of mass information media to interfere in citizens' personal
lives or to infringe their honor and dignity is not permitted and is punish-
able in accordance with the law.
Article 6. USSR legislation and Union and autonomous republics' leg-
islation on the press and other mass information media
Legislation on the press and other mass information media com-
prises the present law and other USSR legislative acts promulgated in
accordance with it, as well as laws and other legislative acts on the press
and other mass information media in Union and autonomous republics.
Chapter II. Organization of the Activity of the Mass Information
Media
Article 7. Founding rights
The right to found a mass information medium belongs to soviets of
people's deputies and other state organs, political parties, social organiza-
tions, mass movements, creative unions, and cooperative, religious, and
other associations of citizens formed in accordance with the law, and also
to labor collectives and citizens of the USSR over the age of 18 years.
Monopolization of any form of mass information medium (press,
radio, television, or others) is not permitted.
Article 8. Registration of mass information media
The editorial offices of mass information media engaged in their ac-
tivity after registration of the mass information medium in question.
Applications for registration of mass information media aimed at a
unionwide public are submitted by the founders to the organs of state
management as laid down by the USSR Council of Ministers, while ap-
plications for registration of mass information media aimed at republican
or local public are submitted to the appropriate executive and adminis-
trative organs. Applications for registration must be examined within
one month of receipt.
The registration of mass information media aimed at republican or
local public can be assigned to other state organs by Union and autono-
mous republics' legislative acts.
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Mass information media aimed at the public abroad are registered
with the USSR Council of Ministers or with Union republic Councils of
Ministers.
The right to embark on the production of mass information remains
valid for one year from the date of receipt of the certificate of registra-
tion. In the event of this time limit being exceeded, the certificate of
registration is deemed to have expired.
Article 9. Application for registration of mass information media
The application for registration of mass information media must
indicate:
1) the founder;
2) the title, language (languages), and location of the mass information
medium;
3) the intended public;
4) the program objectives and tasks;
5) the mass information medium's proposed frequency of publication,
maximum size, and sources of finance.
It is prohibited to make other demands in the process of registration
of mass information media.
Article 10. Cases of dissemination of information without registration
The right to publicly disseminate information without registration
belongs to organs of state power and management and other state organs
for the publication of official normative and other acts and bulletins of
judicial and arbitration practice.
Enterprises, organizations, and academic and scientific institutions
have the right to produce and disseminate any information material and
documentation necessary to their activity without registration. No regis-
tration is required for the production, by the use of technical means, of
printed, audio, and audiovisual matter not intended for public dissemina-
tion or reproduced in manuscript form. No registration is required for
mass information media producing printed matter in print runs of less
than 1,000 copies.
Article 11. Refusal to register a mass information medium
Refusal to issue a certificate of registration of a mass information
medium is possible only on the following grounds:
1) if the title of the mass information medium or its program objective
and tasks are contrary to the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 5
of the present law;
2) if the registering organ has previously issued a certificate to a mass
information medium with the same title;
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3) if the application is submitted within one year of the date when a
decision on cessation of the mass information medium's activity came
into force.
A refusal to effect registration is notified to the applicant in writing,
indicating the grounds for refusal as stipulated by the present Law.
Article 12. Registration fee
A registration fee is charged for the issuing of a certificate of regis-
tration of a mass information medium according to procedures and size
set by USSR or Union or autonomous republic legislation.
Article 13. Cessation of the production or publication of a mass infor-
mation medium
Cessation of the production or publication of a mass information
medium is possible following a decision by the founder, or the organ
which registered the mass information medium, or the court.
The organ which registered the mass information medium or the
court can stop its production or publication in the event of a second vio-
lation of the demands by the first paragraph of Article 5 of the present
Law in any one year.
If a mass information medium is not produced or published for
more than one year, a resumption of its activity requires a new registra-
tion certificate.
In the event that the founder decides to cease production or publica-
tion of a mass information medium, its editorial office labor collective or
its editor (chief editor) has a preferential right to found a mass informa-
tion medium with the same title.
Article 14. Appeal procedure against refusal to register a mass informa-
tion medium or a decision to cease its activity
An appeal may be made to the court by the founder or the editorial
office against a refusal to register a mass information medium, against a
breach by a state organ of the one-month limit set for registration, or
against a decision to cease the activity of a mass information medium,
and the court will hear such appeals, including any property disputes, as
provided by civil procedural legislation.
If the refusal to register a mass information medium or the decision
to stop its activity is deemed to be contrary to the law, this entails the
revocation of the contested decision. A revocation of a decision to cease
a mass information medium's activity entails compensation for losses
sustained by the founder, the editorial office, and the publisher, including
loss of revenue.
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Article 15. Founder, editor, editorial office, and publisher of a mass in-
formation medium
The founder determines the mass information medium's program
(basic principles) of activity. The editorial office or other institution en-
gaged in the production of mass information implements the program on
the basis of professional autonomy.
The editor (chief editor) is appointed and dismissed by the founder
of the mass information medium or is elected and dismissed under the
procedure stipulated in the editorial statutes. The editor (chief editor)
leads the work of the mass information medium's editorial collegium and
editorial office and represents the mass information medium in relations
with the founder, publisher, authors, state organs, social organizations,
other associations of citizens, and citizens, and also in court.
The editor (chief editor) is responsible for ensuring that the mass
information medium's activity complies with the requirements of the
present law and other legislative acts.
The editorial collegium is composed according to the procedure
stipulated by the editorial statutes. The chairman of the editorial col-
legium is the editor (chief editor).
The mass information medium's publisher may be the founder or
may equally be a publishing house or other legal entity offering guaran-
tees of material and technical backing for the production (printing, publi-
cation) or mass information.
Article 16. The editorial statutes of mass information media
The editorial statutes of mass information media are adopted at a
general meeting of the editorial office's collective of journalists by a ma-
jority of votes in the presence of at least two-thirds of the collective, and
are approved by the founder.
The editorial statutes regulate relations between the founder, editor
(chief editor), and the editorial office, and the powers of the journalists'
collective. The statutes include provisions on the procedure for the dis-
tribution and utilization of revenue earned through the mass information
medium's activity, and other provisions.
The editorial statutes must not contravene the law.
Article 17. Production, property, and financial relations between the
founder, the editorial office, and the publisher of mass information media
Production, property, and financial relations between the founder,
the editorial office, and the publisher of mass information media are
based on current legislation and contracts.
The contract specifies:
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the funds for the maintenance of the editorial office;
the proportion of revenue (profit) from the activity of the mass in-
formation medium that is placed at the disposal of the editorial office, the
founder, and the publisher;
the commitments of the founder and the publisher in providing ap-
propriate production, social, and living conditions for the life and work
of employees of the editorial office;
other conditions.
Article 18. Publication data
Each issue of a periodical printed publication must contain the fol-
lowing information:
1) title of the publication;
2) founder;
3) surname and initials of the editor (chief editor);
4) serial number of the issue and date of publication for periodical publi-
cations, as well as the signed-to-press time for newspapers;
5) index number of periodical publications distributed through circula-
tion enterprises;
6) print run;
7) price (where a publication is commercially distributed);
8) address of the editorial office, publisher, and printing house.
On each occasion of going on the air or, where broadcasting is con-
tinuous, not less than four times every 24 hours, the television or radio
broadcasting editorial office is obliged to announce the name of the tele-
vision or radio broadcasting editorial office.
Article 19. Copyright and mandatory copies
Free copyright copies of periodical printed publications are sent im-
mediately on printing to the All-Union Book Chamber, the USSR V.I.
Lenin State Library, the M. Ye. Saltykov-Shehedrin State Public Li-
brary, the founder, and the organ issuing the registration certificate for
the publication in question.
Copyright and mandatory copies of printed matter are also sent to
other institutions and organizations according to procedures stipulated
by the USSR Council of Ministers and the Councils of Ministers of
Union and autonomous republics.
Article 20. Retention of television and radio program material
Television or radio broadcasting editorial offices must retain pro-
gram material for one month after it is broadcast on the air, and must
keep a registration log of programs going on the air without prior record-
ing which shows the program's topic, its date and its start and end times,
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and the anchorman's surname and name. The registration log of such
programs is retained for one year from the date of the last entry in it.
Chapter III. Dissemination of Mass Information
Article 21. Procedure for dissemination of mass information media
output
The dissemination of the output of mass information media is car-
ried out by the publisher directly or on a contractual or other legal basis
by circulation enterprises, other organizations, or by citizens.
The dissemination of the output of mass information media without
publication data is prohibited.
Article 22. Authorization of the dissemination of mass information
The dissemination of each individual issue (with its own publication
data) produced by a mass information medium is permitted only after the
editor (chief editor) has given authorization for its publication
(broadcast).
The print run of a press publication is determined by the editor
(chief editor) by agreement with the publisher.
The hindrance of the dissemination of mass information media out-
put when done in compliance with the law or the confiscation of a print
run or a part thereof are not permitted otherwise than on the basis of a
legally binding court decision.
Article 23. Official announcements
The publication of official announcements by organs of state power
and management is mandatory for mass information media founded by
the organs.
The editorial office is obliged to publish free of charge and within a
specified time legally valid decisions by a court or state arbitration organ
that contain instructions stipulating the publication of such decisions
through the said mass information medium in question.
Chapter IV. Relations Between Mass Information Media and Citizens
and Organizations
Article 24. The right to receive information through mass information
media
Citizens have the right to receive promptly through the mass infor-
mation media reliable reports on the activity of state organs, social orga-
nizations, and officials.
The mass information media have the right to receive such informa-
tion from state organs, social organizations, and officials. State organs,
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social organizations, and officials provide the mass information media
with available reports and an opportunity to inspect documents.
An appeal against refusal to provide information that has been re-
quested may be made by mass information media representatives to a
higher-level organ or official, and afterwards to the court according to
procedures laid down by the law on appeals against unlawful actions by
organs of state management and officials which infringe citizens' rights.
Article 25. Use of copyright materials and letters
The use of works of journalism, literature, art, and science by the
mass information media is permitted provided that copyrights are com-
plied with.
No one has the right to oblige a mass information medium to pub-
lish materials rejected by the editorial office, unless the law stipulates
otherwise.
In the publication of readers' letters, the abridgement and editing of
their text is permitted, provided that the sense of the letters is not
distorted.
Article 26. Right to refutation and reply
A citizen or an organization has the right to request a mass informa-
tion medium's editorial office to refute published reports that do not con-
form with reality or defame their honor and dignity.
The citizen or organization whose rights and legitimate interests
have been infringed by reports published in mass information media has
the right to have his or its reply published in the same mass information
medium.
The refutation or reply is published, either under a special rubric or
on the same page and in the same typeface as the report being refuted, as
follows: Not later than one month following receipt of the demand in the
case of newspapers, or in the next issue under preparation in the case of
other periodical publications.
The refutation or reply is read out by the radio or television an-
nouncer in the same program or series of programs and at the same time,
not later than one month following receipt of the demand. The right to
read out the reply can also be exercised by the citizen himself or a repre-
sentative of the organization demanding that a reply be published.
The editorial office is obliged to publish a reply running to not more
than one page of standard typewritten text. No editing of the reply's text
is permitted.
Article 27. Court hearing of an application to publish a refutation or
reply
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In the event that publication of the refutation or reply is refused or
the mass information medium is in breach of the one-month time limit
set for such publication, the citizen or organization in question is entitled
to appeal to the court within one year of the date of publication.
The court hears the application to have a refutation or reply pub-
lished by a mass information medium's editorial office according to pro-
cedures laid down by civil procedural legislation.
Article 28. Special cases of nonpublication of information
A mass information medium's editorial office or a journalist is not
entitled:
1) to name a person who has provided information on condition that his
name is not revealed, except when requested to do so by the court;
2) to publish information from a preliminary investigation without the
written permission of the prosecutor, investigator, or person conducting
the inquiry;
3) to publicize any information which could result in revealing the iden-
tity of a juvenile offender without his own consent and the consent of his
lawful representative;
4) to prejudice in their reports the results of a judicial hearing of a spe-
cific case or otherwise to influence the court prior to its decision or sen-
tence coming legally into force.
Chapter V. Rights and Duties of the Journalist
Article 29. The journalist
In the present law, journalist means a person engaged in the gather-
ing, creation, editing, or preparation of material for a mass information
medium and associated with the said medium through labor or other
contractual relations or engaged in such activity with its authorization.
Article 30. The journalist's rights
1) to seek, obtain, and disseminate information;
2) to be received by officials in connection with the exercise of his profes-
sional duties as a journalist;
3) to make any recordings, including recordings made using audiovisual
equipment and movie and still photography, except when otherwise pro-
vided by law;
4) on presentation of his credentials as a journalist, to be present in natu-
ral disaster areas and at rallies and demonstrations;
5) to ask for specialist assistance in checking facts and circumstances in
connection with material available to him;
6) to refuse to put his name to material contrary to his convictions;
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7) to remove his signature from materials whose content, in his opinion,
was distorted in the process of editorial preparation;
8) to stipulate anonymity.
A journalist also enjoys other rights granted to him in accordance
with the present law.
Article 31. Accreditation of journalists
The mass information media may, by agreement with state organs
and organs of social organizations, accredit their own journalists to those
organs and organizations.
Organs that have given a journalist accreditation are obliged to no-
tify him beforehand of sittings, conferences, and other events and to pro-
vide him with stenographic transcripts, protocols, and other documents.
Article 32. The journalist's duties
A journalist has the duty:
1) to implement the program of activity of the mass information medium
with which he has a labor relationship and to take guidance from the
editorial statutes;
2) to check the authenticity of the information he reports;
3) to satisfy requests by persons providing information that they be iden-
tified as authors if such information is being published for the first time;
4) to refuse an instruction given to him by the editor (chief editor) or
editorial office if it entails an infringement of the law;
5) to respect the rights, legitimate interests, and national dignity of citi-
zens and the rights and legitimate interests of organizations.
A journalist also takes on other duties stemming from the present law.
Chapter VI. International Cooperation in the Sphere of Mass
Information
Article 33. International treaties and agreements
International cooperation in the sphere of mass information is car-
ried out on the basis of international treaties concluded by the USSR and
the Union republics.
If an international treaty by the USSR lays down norms different
from those contained in the present Law, the norms of the international
treaty apply.
The mass information media, journalists' professional organizations,
and other creative unions participate in international cooperation in the
mass information sphere and, for this purpose, can conclude agreements
with foreign citizens and organizations.
USSR citizens have the right to access to information from foreign
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sources, including direct television broadcasting, radio broadcasting, and
press.
Article 34. Activity of representatives of foreign mass information me-
dia and diplomatic and other missions of foreign states in the USSR
The legal position and professional activity of foreign correspon-
dents and other representatives of foreign mass information media ac-
credited to the USSR, as well as the information activity of diplomatic,
consular, and other official missions of foreign states in the USSR, are
regulated by USSR and Union republic legislation in conformity with
international treaties of the USSR and the Union republics.
Chapter VII. Liability for Infringement of legislation on the Press and
Other Mass Information Media
Article 35. Grounds for liability in respect to breaches of legislation on
the press and other mass information media
Abuse of the freedom of speech, dissemination of information which
does not correspond with reality and defames the honor and dignity of a
citizen or organization, and pressure on the courts by journalists, entail
criminal, administrative, or other liability in accordance with USSR and
Union republic legislation.
USSR and Union republic legislation can institute liability for other
breaches of legislation on the press and other mass information media.
Liability for infringement of legislation on the press and other mass
information media falls on officials of state and social organizations, as
well as on the editorial office and editor (chief editor) or a mass informa-
tion medium and the authors of disseminated reports and materials.
Article 36. Impermissibility of interference in the activity of mass infor-
mation media
Any hindrance by officials of state and public organs of journalists'
professional activity or coercion of journalists to disseminate or to refuse
the dissemination of information entails criminal liability and is punish-
able with a fine of up to 500 rubles [R].
Article 37. Liability for illegal compilation and dissemination of mass
information
The compilation and dissemination of output by a mass information
medium, either without it being registered in accordance with the present
law or following a decision to cease its production or publication, entail
administrative liability punishable by a fine of up to R500 imposed by a
people's judge and confiscation of the print run of printed or other
output.
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The commission of a second infringement of the first paragraph of
this article within any one year entails criminal liability and is punishable
with a fine of up to R1,000 with or without confiscation of technical
facilities belonging to the culprit and used for the compilation and dis-
semination of information.
Article 38. Cases when liability for the dissemination of information
which does not conform with reality is lifted
The editor (chief editor) and equally a journalist, is not liable for the
dissemination of information which does not conform with reality by a
mass information medium:
1) if this information was contained in official reports;
2) if it was received from news agencies or the press services of state and
public organs;
3) if it is a verbatim reproduction of speeches by people's deputies at
congresses and soviet session or by delegates at congresses, conferences,
and plenums of social organizations, or of official statements by officials
of state and public organs;
4) if it was contained in authors' statements which have gone on the air
without being prerecorded, or in texts not allowed to be edited in con-
formity with the present law.
Article 39. Payment of moral damages
Moral (nonmaterial) damages suffered by a citizen as a result of the
dissemination by a mass information medium of reports that do not con-
form with reality and that defame the honor and dignity of a citizen or
inflict other nonmaterial damage on a citizen are paid by a court decision
by the mass information medium and also by guilty officials and citizens.
The size of payments for moral (nonmaterial) damages is determined by
the court.
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APPENDIX 3
DECREE ISSUED BY PRESIDENT MIKHAIL GORBACHEV IN MOSCOW
ON 8 FEBRUARY "ON THE CREATION OF AN ALL-UNION
STATE TELEVISION AND RADIO BROADCASTING
COMPANY"
Moscow, 8 Feb (TASS)-We are transmitting the decree signed today
by Mikhail Gorbachev, president of the USSR, "On the creation of an
All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company":
"To further perfect the system of administration of television and radio
in the country, I resolve:
1.- That an All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Com-
pany be created, having transferred to it the fixed assets and other state
property in the possession on 1 January 1991 of the USSR State Commit-
tee for Television and Radio Broadcasting and of the associations, enter-
prises, and organizations within its jurisdiction.
That the television and radio company being created retain the functions,
rights, and duties of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio
Broadcasting and that the overall numbers and levels of budgetary allo-
cations and conditions of the economic mechanism currently in opera-
tion be preserved.
2. That Comrade Leonid Petrovich Kravchenko be appointed chair-
man of the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Com-
pany, and that he be released from the duties of chairman of the USSR
State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting.
"That Comrade L.P. Kravchenko be instructed within two weeks:
"To present for approval by the president of the USSR draft regulations
on the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, en-
visioning that the chairman of the All-Union State Television and Radio
Broadcasting Company will possess the rights of a leader of a central
body of the USSR state administration:
To present to the Cabinet of Ministers of the USSR proposals on finan-
cial provision and other questions concerning the activity of the All-
Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company.
3. That for the purpose of improving coordination of scientific and
technical and program policy in the sphere of television and radio broad-
casting and expansion of the opportunities of the republics for developing
international links in this sphere. An All-Union council for Television
and Radio Broadcasting be set up. That Comrade L.P. Kravchenko,
chairman of the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting
Company, be invested with the leadership of this Council.
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That it be established that the leaders of the republics' television and
radio organizations are members of the Council being part of its compo-
sition on a voluntary basis.
That Comrade L.P. Kravchenko be charged with putting forward within
two weeks proposals on the regulations and working apparatus of the
All-Union Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting.
4. That it be established that the force of Article 3 of the decree of the
USSR president of 2 November 1990 'On special procedures for the use
of foreign currency resources in 1991' concerning the obligatory sale to
the Bank for Foreign Economic Activity of the USSR of a portion of
foreign currency proceeds does not extend to the foreign economic activ-
ity of the All-Union State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company.
5. That the USSR Cabinet of Ministers deal with matters emanating
from the present decree.
6. That the present decree be put into effect from the moment of its
publication.
Moscow TASS International Service in Russian at 1731 GMT on 8
February transmits an abridged version of the above decree, adding the
following comment at the end: This decree was expected in journalistic
circles, and is regarded as an important step toward the decentralization
of the radio broadcasting and television system in the country."
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